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Intellectual Property Rights in Digital Media:
A Comparative Analysis of Legal Protection,
Technological Measures, and New Business
Models under EU and U.S. Law
NICOLA LUCCHI t
INTRODUCTION
How can intellectual property law operate to reward
authors for their works, and to provide incentives for new
creations, while not hindering freedom of expression and
the free movement of information? How can intellectual
property law promote access to culture and the free flow of
ideas? How is it possible, in the new digital era, to reduce
the number of violations of intellectual property rights and
to balance the rights of holders and users? What are the
new business models, the recent legal protections, and the
technological measures used to deal with the use,
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Universiti Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy, for providing critical
remarks and suggestions on earlier drafts of this piece. I am also grateful to
Robert Cooter, Mark Lemley and Pamela Samuelson for providing the occasion
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distribution, and control of digital media? How can they
work?
Some of these questions have yet to find reasonable
answers. However, increased consciousness and worldwide
debates about these new problems should assist in their
solution.1 A clearer view of the ongoing legal and techno-
logical approaches could also emerge from a comparative
analysis of the American and European patterns. 2
The production of digital content is a phenomenon
which has completely changed the conditions of access to
knowledge. 3 It has become one of the most important assets
1. In the last few years there were several international conferences and
workshops on these and connected subjects, ACM CCS, Workshop on Digital
Rights Management (DRM); DRM 2005 (Washington D.C.); DRM 2004
(Washington D.C.); DRM 2003 (Washington D.C); DRM 2002 (Washington D.C);
DRM 2001 (Philadelphia); Consumer Communications and Networking
Conference (CCNC) 2005; Workshop on Digital Rights Management Impact on
Consumer Communications (Las Vegas); Australasian Information Security
Workshop (AISW) 2005: Digital Rights Management (Newcastle, Australia);
University of Dortmund, Digital Rights Management Conference, 2005, 2002,
2000, (Berlin); International Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) Workshop:
2005 (Lisbon), 2004 (Vienna); Berkeley Center for Law and Technology (BCLT),
The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management Conference: What Will
DRM Technologies Mean for the Future of Information?, 2003 (Berkeley);
Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique, World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C): Workshop on Digital Rights Management (Sophia
Antipolis, France).
2. As some commentators have noted, most of the literature on the digital
media is ethnocentric, that is, it refers only to the experience of a single
country. It "is written in general terms, as though the model that prevailed in
that country were universal." In this framework, comparative analysis can have
two functions: (1) concept formation and clarification and (2) evaluation of the
role in causal inference. Comparative analysis is also "valuable in social
investigation because it sensitizes us to variation and to similarity, and this can
contribute powerfully to concept formation and to the refinement of our
conceptual apparatus." Furthermore, it has been underlined how, in media
systems, there is a relation between countries with the most-developed media
scholarship, including the United States, and countries with less developed
traditions of media research. This relation results in a tendency to borrow the
literature of other countries-usually the Anglo-American-and to treat that
borrowed literature as though it could be applied unproblematically anywhere.
See DANIEL C. HALLIN & PAOLO MANCINI, COMPARING MEDIA SYSTEMS: THREE
MODELS OF MEDIA AND POLITICS 2 (2004).
3. See COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, at ix (2000) [hereinafter
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for economic growth, enterprise, and employment; for
enhancing professional, social, and cultural development;
and for fostering the creative and innovative capacity of
modern society.4 In this framework it becomes even more
important to find and formulate a new settlement for
intellectual property rights.
Intellectual property rights 5 -such as copyrights,
patents, trademarks, and so on-offer the legal protection
upon which authors, inventors, firms, researchers, and
others rely to protect their creations. Intellectual property
rights dictate what use can legally be made of the creative
work, and are thus essential to ensuring that authors are
rewarded for their efforts.6
The advent of the Internet, however, has raised a new
and unexpected challenge, making it more difficult to reach
a balance, and has fostered an extremely protective
environment where works are considered similar to
physical properties, with rights-holders accorded extensive
control over them.7
At the same time, digital technologies allow perfect,
inexpensive, and unlimited copying and dissemination of
content.8 Without adequate protection and enforcement,
authors may decide not to make their content available in
DIGITAL DILEMMA] (discussing the different threats to the intellectual property
rules and practice produced by digital technology and describing as a "digital
dilemma" the technical, legal, political, economic and sociological issues
connected to the advent of digital information).
4. See id.
5. In general terms, the expression "intellectual property" can be considered
to include anything coming from the working of the human brain such as ideas,
concepts, inventions, stories, songs, etc. However, there is a basic difference
between intellectual property and intellectual property rights. The latter, in
fact, defines the issue to encompass those aspects of the topic which receive a
measure of legal protection. See e.g., IAN J. LLOYD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LAW 304 (4th ed. 2004).
6. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 15 (3d ed. 2003) (describing the economic incentive
benefit of intellectual property protection and the necessity for encouraging
inventors, authors, and artists to invest in the process of creation).
7. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 8-12.
8. See id. at 3-6.
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digital form. 9 In short, times are changing, and the needs of
the information society differ from those of its industrial
predecessor. 10
This Article argues, in essence, that the owners of the
old technology are trying to block the way to what they see
as antagonism, failing to comprehend the original
formulation of intellectual property law (e.g., the right to
control copying), and the new means to be applied in the
digital environment." The Internet, in fact, offers new
possibilities in terms of appropriation and distribution, and
so the law should be re-designed, possibly in terms of
economic exploitation, but considering the original aim of
copyright law. 12 It could be also necessary, in view of the
Internet's potential, to craft a new business model shaped
around its own characteristics. 13
The first section of this Article outlines how the balance
that copyright law originally tried to establish has been
jeopardized, and how, in response to the threats
9. When information is recorded in digital format, the job of the copier is
much easier. The copy of a digital work will be the same in terms of quality as
the original because it is the exact copy of a machine readable binary digit code
(a series of zeros and ones). The same effect will apply no matter how many
generations of copies are created. Furthermore the speed with which copies may
be disseminated is also increased thanks to the power of the internet. See id. at 32.
10. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 33 (2d ed.
2002).
11. See Mohanbir Sawhney, Hand in Hand, CONTEXT MAGAZINE (2000),
available at http://www.contextmag.com/setFrameRedirect.asp?src=/archives/
200004/DigitalStrategy.asp.
12. In the United States, the original aim of copyright is codified in the U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. However, it is necessary to remark about the substantial
differences of approach in the historical foundations of the countries from the
droit d'auteur tradition and countries from the copyright tradition. Several
commentators remark about a movement of harmonization of copyright
principles at an international level. See, e.g., Gillian Davies, The Convergence of
Copyright and Authors'Rights-Reality or Chimera?, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& COPYRIGHT L. 964, 965 (1995) (observing that the Berne Convention had
"provided a bridge" between the two systems); J.A.L. Sterling, Creator's Right
and the Bridge Between Author's Right and Copyright, 29 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 302 (1998). For an illustrative example of the differences
between the two models compare TULLIO ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA
CONCORRENZA E DEI BENI MATERIALI 355 (1960), and 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 317 (1989).
13. See infra Part III.D.
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digitalization posed to copyright piracy, rights-holders have
managed to create a system where their creations are
protected to the same extent as physical goods. So, they set
up a system where they exercise extensive control over
access and use of their works, with consequent impairment
of users' rights.
The second section discusses the measures taken at the
legislative level to protect authors' rights. Particular
attention is given to the situation in the United States, now
leading in technological and legal developments. 14 A
comparative analysis will be made between legal protec-
tions, technological measures, and anti-circumvention
provisions recently adopted in continental Europe and in
the United States.
I also outline the debate surrounding peer-to-peer
systems and the adverse effects of content industry
lobbying activity, in particular the violent reactions against
illegal file sharing and its users.
The third section looks at the technological measures
embraced to secure content and prevent it from being
copied and illegally shared over the Internet. It considers
how the content industry is trying to develop licensing
systems for online content distribution, imposing through
technology excessive restrictions on the users' ability to
enjoy the goods purchased. In particular, I reveal the
upsetting trend to convert technological protection
measures into functional equivalents of privately legislated
intellectual property rights. 15
The Article concludes with an overview of the adverse
effects, and the possible solutions, under U.S. and EU law
posed by using contractual arrangements to expand
intellectual property rights. Finally, it also proposes to
learn from the old media experience because new
14. See Hector L. MacQueen, Copyright and the Internet, in LAW AND THE
INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 181, 184 (Lilian Edwards
& Charlotte Waelde eds., 2d ed. 2000).
15. See James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global
Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109 (2003); J.H.
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property
Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 878 (1999).
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technologies do not necessarily destroy the current
architecture. On the contrary, they create new business
opportunities. 16 Old technologies have to find ways to
cooperate with, or even co-opt, the new technology. 17 The
real solution, in fact, is that intellectual property rights
rules need to be adapted to our digital times. A balance
must be found between the interests of rights-holders and
users, and between protecting the original creative
investment and enabling legal or licensed re-use by
others. 18
I. FEARS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF DIGITAL MEDIA
The Internet, as a global medium, has the potential to
reach an unlimited number of people instantaneously, with
minimum expenses, and with no restrictions in terms of
time and geographical limits. 19 Ubiquitous networking and
low-cost computing offer an environment where products
that were typically distributed as physical goods can now be
delivered completely in digital form.20 This transformation
has extensive implications for the cost structure21 and
strategies of content intermediaries. 22
The digitization of content, in fact, combined with the
increasing adoption of broadband distribution technologies,
16. See Sawhney, supra note 11.
17. See id.
18. Copyright law must reach "a balance between a copyright holder's
legitimate demand for effective.., protection.., and the rights of others freely
to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce." Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
19. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 2-5 (2001).
20. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 32 (observing that "information in
digital form is largely liberated from the medium that carries it"); see also John
M. Gallaugher et al., Revenue Streams and Digital Content Providers: An
Empirical Investigation, 38 INFO. & MGMT. 473, 476 (2001).
21. Production of information goods has high fixed costs but low marginal
costs, or "is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce." CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R.
VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3
(1999).
22. See George M. Giaglis et al., The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic
Marketplaces: Developing a Contingency Model, 12 INFO. SYS. J. 231 (2002).
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represents a revolution and a challenge that may be the
greatest opportunity for the growth of new business and the
transformation of the traditional distribution models. 23 The
consequences brought about in the content industry as a
result of the new technologies are already before our eyes.
For example, the combination of MP3 technology-
compressing digital files up to 1/22nd of their original size
and significantly reducing their storage space2 4 -and peer-
to-peer technology-ensuring independence from central
servers so that file transfers occur directly through
computers-has determined a substantial transformation
in how intellectual creations are appropriated, used and
distributed, maximizing the opportunities for the spread of
culture, while also enhancing possibilities for illegal
appropriation and distribution of pirated, counterfeit, and
unauthorized products. 25 One of the effects of this new
settlement has been the possibility of a drastic shift in
power. In fact, the web can be converted into an inexpensive
and widespread distribution medium. 26
In such a situation, it is evident that the owners of the
old distribution technology are afraid of losing control over
authors, composers, and performers because their role could
become unnecessary.27 In fact, the intermediation of
publishers, distributors, and record companies can be easily
eliminated. 28 In order to maintain their business, content
23. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 21.
24. See generally Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection
Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, 22
EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198 (2000). The same article was presented at the
Workshop on Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and
the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (Geneva, Dec. 6-7, 1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/wct~wppt/pdf/
imp99_3.pdf.
25. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 90 (describing the industry
consequences of the new technology).
26. See id.
27. Technology promotes the elimination of those individuals and
organizations between end-users and originators. This concept is summarized
by the term "disintermediation." See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 90.
28. See Alina M. Chircu & Robert J. Kauffman, Strategies for Internet
Middlemen in the Intermediation /Disintermediation/Reintermediation Cycle, 9
ELECTRONIC MARKETS 109, 113 (1999).
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intermediaries are obliged to make a radical change. The
arrival of the new distribution systems is forcing
suppliers to undergo an inevitable metamorphosis
towards decentralization and disintermediation in
content management systems. 29 Content intermediaries
alarmed by the inevitable process of elimination of their
role in the transaction process are resorting to very strict
copyright protection measures. 30
Therefore, if the most important application of the new
distribution technologies is allowing flow of information,
content providers have initially argued that any
technological security measures used to distribute content
through the Internet can eventually be circumvented and
that, consequently, new legal protections for copyrighted
works in the network environment are also required. 31
Content providers also fail to perceive some positive aspects
of the new distribution technology, such as the dramatic
reduction of production and distribution costs 32 because
29. For an overview of the disintermediation issues see George M. Giaglis et
al., Disintermediation, Reintermediation, or Cybermediation? The Future of
Intermediaries in Electronic Marketplaces, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH
INTERNATIONAL BLED ELECTRONIC COMMERCE CONFERENCE, BLED, SLOVENIA,
JUNE 7-9, 1999 at 389 (Stefan Klein, Joze Gricar & Andreja Pucihar eds., 1999);
Michael D. Smith et al., Understanding Digital Markets: Review and
Assessment, in UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 99, 121 (Erik
Brynjolfsson & Brian Kahin eds., 2000). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 41 (2004).
30. However, some seem to prefer to preserve the status quo. The content
industry, in fact, is lobbying to protect its supremacy. For a more general
analysis about the various ways in which institutional features can facilitate or
impede the improvement of legal rules, see Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects
in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998).
31. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). But see Kamiel Koelman, The Protection of Technological
Measures vs. the Copyright Limitations, in ADJUNCTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO
COPYRIGHT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALAI CONGRESS JUNE 13-17, 2001 at 448 (Jane
C. Ginsburg & June M. Besek eds., 2002).
32. See Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking
Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1240 (2000). Reduced costs could increase
the size of the surplus to be had from transactions involving contents. The
challenge and opportunity for copyright owners is how this new marginal
surplus will be distributed either in the form of increased profits or lower prices.
[Vol. 531118
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digital data are no longer inseparable from a physical
carrier, but could now be represented as abstract strings
and symbols. 33 Technology, then, can promote ethics and
the public good by reducing transactions costs.3 4 Digital
products are also particularly well-structured for price
discrimination, and consumers are often ready to pay for
immediate online access to specific content: a large variety
of content, in fact, may be easily disaggregated and
distributed on demand. 35 "Digital content also benefits from
the ability to exploit various strata of consumers that can
be classified by intent-to-use and immediacy-of-need. '36
Finally, the migration of consumers to new media, the
shifting expectations of consumers, the possibility to
market to an increasingly diverse and stratified customer
base, and the tangible differences of entirely digital vs.
physical products, create a multitude of options for revenue
generation. 37
Probably for these reasons, content providers are now
looking with positive interest to "pay-per-view" or "pay-per-
download" web services. 38 At the same time, many artists
and authors seem to be convinced that it is possible to take
advantage of the opportunity to directly expose themselves
to the public even if the role currently played by major
See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music is it Anyway?: How We Came to View
Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1413 (2004).
33. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 32 (observing that information in
digital form is largely liberated from the medium that carries it).
34. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1997). On the point of social norms, see also Eric A. Posner, Efficient norms, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 19 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998).
35. See Hal Varian, Pricing Information Goods, in PROCEEDINGS OF
SCHOLARSHIP IN THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT SYMPOSIUM (Carol Hughes
ed., 1995).
36. Gallaugher et al., supra note 20, at 479 (2001).
37. See id.
38. As demonstrated by the Apple iTunes experience, the real issue is the
requirement of new philosophy. If content providers identify and focus on
consumer needs instead of on business or control opportunities, innovation is
possible. See generally Urs Gasser, iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and
Technology Shape the Business of Digital Media-A Case Study (Berkman Ctr.
for Internet & Soc'y at Harvard Law School Research Publ'n No. 7, 2004),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=556802.
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distribution companies is still a restraint on complete
transformation in the world of content circulation. 9
Conscious of the chance the Internet has to overtake
the archaic monopolistic business model allowing authors to
reach their audience autonomously, the content industry
has been working towards the establishment of a safe
infrastructure by looking to regional and global solutions in
order to leverage resources, decrease cost, and increase the
implementation of standardized technological protection
measures. 40 At the same time, the current efforts at
building an effective copy security structure have demon-
strated the necessity to obtain laws that support protection
technologies and prohibit the circumvention of technology
protected works. 41
An essential part of this paper will evaluate each
condition and determine whether the imposed restrictions
on a user's right could represent the correct and effective
reaction to the disrespect of intellectual property rights.
A. Intellectual Property: A Tool for Economic Development?
Historically, the cradle of the IP system is considered
the renaissance of northern Italy. A Venetian law of 1474
(the so called "Parte Veneziana") made the first systematic
attempt to protect inventions by a form of patent, which
39. For example, current technology allows non-professional musicians to
make high quality recordings and distribute them through the Internet directly
to the public, bypassing intermediaries and with significant reductions in costs.
See JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM-NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF
MusIc 64 (2002).
40. Regarding self-help measures and their purposes, see, e.g., Charles
Clark, The Answer To the Machine Is In the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996). See
also Kenneth W. Adam, Self-help in the Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 103 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) also in 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of
Self Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); David Friedman, In Defense of
Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151 (1998) (commenting on Cohen,
supra note 40); and Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems
and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997).
41. See Marks & Turnbull, supra note 24.
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granted an exclusive right to an individual for the first
time.42 In the same century, the invention of movable type
and the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg, around
1450, contributed to the birth of the first copyright system
in the world. Copyright is a form of intellectual property
rights developed in response to the advent and rapid
evolution of printing technology. 43 It is an instrument to
both control the quality of the material made public and to
regulate trade, preventing works from being pirated.44 Past
and present experience demonstrate that knowledge and
inventions have played an essential role in economic
growth 45 and, at the same time, states have had another
42. Venice was considered the first city in Europe in which the business of
printing and publishing became significant, and was the precursor to the
system of copyright. See PAUL F. GRENDLER, THE ROMAN INQUISITION AND THE
VENETIAN PRESS 1540-1605 (1977); GEORGE PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS
DURING THE MIDDLE AGES; A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE PRODUCTION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO THE
CLOSE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 404-05 (1962); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID,
TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836 142 n.l0 (1998) (Italy provided exclusive rights to
inventors for their inventions through the Venetian Law of 1474). England
followed in 1623 with the Statute of Monopolies. See id; see also ADRIANO
VANZETTI & VICENCENZO DI CATALDO, MANUALE DI DIRITTo INDUSTRIALE 265
(2000). This first exclusive right was granted from the Republic of Venice to the
printer of the Histories of Pliny the Elder. See RICHARD CROSBY DEWOLF, AN
OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (1986) (1925).
43. See ELIZABETH EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE:
COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE
27-29, 36 (1979); GILLIAN DAVIES, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 14 (2d
ed. 2002).
44. See SIMON STOKES, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (2002). For
a discussion of the history of copyright, see generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION (1986); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING
OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1999); Daniel Burkitt, Copyrighting
Culture: The History and Cultural Specificity of the Western Model of Copyright,
2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 146 (2001); Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New
Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual
Property, 20 PROMETHEUS 159 (2002), available at http://taylorandfrancis.
metapress.com/index/QAAXAY05786CLA16.pdf.
45. See Kamil Idris, International Intellectual Property: Introduction, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 209, 210 (2003); WIPO, Intellectual Property: A Power Tool
for Economic Growth, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/wipo-pub_888/
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indispensable role "recognizing, conferring and protecting
intellectual property rights. ' 46 Economists suggest exactly
that the accumulation of knowledge is the driving force
behind economic growth.47 However, despite the economic
service fulfilled, when intellectual property rights (and
copyright in particular) were first introduced, the main
concern for legislators of common law as well as civil law
countries48  was to encourage "creativity, science and
democracy. '49 They indeed focused primarily on users'
interests, according authors and publishers a level of
protection just strong enough to encourage and reward
wipo-pub_888_l.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). Rapid knowledge creation,
including the emergence of new technologies, resulted in policy changes
regarding intellectual property and the adoption of new knowledge-asset
management practices. One of the consequences of the emerging importance of
IP and the new pattern of global trade that started in the beginning of the
1990s was the forging of a deliberate connection between the two. Some
developed countries began to use trade measures to curb piracy of intellectual
property rights abroad. Among other things, this led to the inclusion of the
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) as one of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements resulting
from the multilateral trade negotiations under the Uruguay Round. See id.
46. RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHT CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (1996).
47. See Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 1002 (1986). In this paper Romer proposes a model, quite different from
the neo-classical economic theory, where economic growth is driven by the
accumulation of knowledge. As pointed out by the author, this theory is based
on "a model of long-term growth in which knowledge is assumed to be an input
in production that has increasing marginal productivity. It is essentially a
competitive equilibrium model with endogenous technological change." Id.
48. The Common Law tradition emphasizes the economic role of copyright
and the role played by the idea of "public sphere" and was expressly purported
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" (as later recognized in the
American Constitution under Art. I, § 8, cl. 8), thus representing the essential
incentive to encourage artists to produce more. In the civil law tradition, where
works were considered a reflection of authors' personality, copyright was
instead considered a way to reward artists for their contribution to culture. This
perception is reflected in the name "author-law" (droit d'auteur) given to the
topic by several continental systems. See Copyright and the Internet, in LAW
AND THE INTERNET-REGULATING CYBERSPACE 68-69 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte
Waelde eds., 1997); MacQueen, supra note 14, at 182.
49. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS-THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVTY 4 (2001).
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them, but weak enough not to prevent free flow of culture
and information. 50
In this sense, in the American tradition, the public
granted authors a limited exclusive right in return for the
prompt public dissemination of the work.51 But, when
authors realized they could make a living out of their work
and publishing corporations spotted the right excuse for
strengthening their position, the original focus of copyright
law got lost. 52 Policy talks started to lose ground, and to be
slowly but steadily replaced by property talks.53
50. See id. at 5. For a complete analysis on the democratic origin of
copyright law and its importance in maintaining and furthering a democratic
civil society, see Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic
Orthodoxy of Rights Management, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Mark Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989
(1997); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283 (1996); and Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do
Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual
Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989).
51. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 78 (2001).
52. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 38-41. This battle reached an
important moment in England in 1709, with the enactment of the Statute of
Anne recognizing for publishers an extended monopoly for a further twenty-one
years and for authors protection over their works for fourteen years plus
fourteen. Although both their positions had been made stronger, the statute
never meant to diminish the value and the centrality of the public's interests,
and acted in support of the diffusion of culture. Before the Statute of Anne,
England only knew the 1557 Stationers' Company Charter, granting publishers
a monopoly over distribution of written works, but not a right of property over
them. With Millar v. Taylor (1769), stationers obtained the recognition of
authors' natural property right over their productions, implying the abolition of
Statute of Anne's anti-monopolistic provisions and the recognition of a common
law "copyright" that existed in perpetuity. This condition only lasted until
Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), when the absence of a perpetual right was
ultimately maintained. For a detailed explanation of the controversy in Millar
v. Taylor (1769) and Donaldson v. Beckett (1774), see Mark Rose, The Author as
Proprietor: Donaldson v. Beckett and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, in
OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 23 (Brad Sherman & Alain
Strouwel eds., 1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993).
53. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 46-47. This quarrel, as already
pointed out, concluded in England in 1709, with the enactment of the Statute of
Anne (entered into force in 1710). For existing works, "authors or their assigns"
were granted the exclusive right of publication for twenty-one years from the
effective date of April 10, 1710. For new works, the right ran for fourteen years
from the date of publication; the author, if living at the expiration of such term,
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An important step in that direction was probably taken
in the meeting of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) in 1976, when intellectual creations
were first addressed in terms of "intellectual property" and
an emphasis was primarily put on commercial
exploitation. 54 While the use of a new expression may seem
like just a terminological issue, changing the emphasis from
property to economic potential degraded the works from
their status as the "engine" of development to mere
consumer goods.5 5 Their social value was reduced, while fair
use and access to culture lost their original dimension as
rights and became something closer to mere concepts. 56
Actually, intellectual creations are cultural goods whose
main value lies in their power to support the progress of
society.5 7 They undoubtedly become commercial goods,
protected to the same extent as tangible property and
shaped in terms of usage rights. 58 With the exception of fair
was granted the privilege of renewal for 14 more years. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 1
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 11-12 (1994). For a comment about the reasons
why information is not generally characterized as property, see Samuelson
supra note 50, at 369.
54. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 160; see also Francesca Calovi,
Post-Napster: Protecting Content Owners Rights in the Peer-to-Peer
Environment (2003) (unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Leeds) (on
file with author); Francesca Calovi & Nicola Lucchi, Pirateria Musicale:
Tecnologia e Diritto, 7/8 STUDIUM IURIS 1027 (2004).
55. For analysis of the issue, see DEBORA J. HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICS OF EXPANDING OWNERSHIP
RIGHTS (1999).
56. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Commodification and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 149, 171-72 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds.,
2002). In particular, a great impulse towards the adoption of measures
enhancing monopoly came in the mid-eighties from America, which was
undergoing a fundamental transformation from industrial to information
society, and-with the anxiety of maintaining international economic
supremacy-brought copyright issues to the top of its agenda and to the
attention of the whole international community. See HALBERT, supra note 55, at
77-81 (1999).
57. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner,
Economic Analysis].
58. See JAN VAN DIJK, THE NETWORK SOCIETY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF NEW MEDIA
133 (Leontine Spoorenberg trans., 1999) (1991).
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use, unrestricted enjoyment of legitimately purchased
works became minimized with the consequent impairment
of the original copyright balance. 59
Common literature on intellectual property rights
supports the thesis that they operate as an incentive to
create and to make known new inventions or ideas. 60 On
the other hand, even if this theory could be applicable in a
wide range of cases, it is essentially unsuccessful if we look
to a range of effects arising from new legal institutions and
59. The fair use exception in the United States copyright system is the most
important exception to the rights-holder's rights, and it often plays an intricate
role in the relation between freedom of expression and copyright. On the
relations between copyright and freedom of expression, see Floyd Abrams, First
Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1 (1987); Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright
and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1011-15 (1970); Lionel Sobel,
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971), quoted in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). For a European perspective, see P. Bernt
Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, in EXPANDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERY, supra note 40, at 343. The fair use
exception is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). In Europe, where copyright's
features always appeared to be closer to those of a reward rather then a
bargain, the 1886 Berne Convention represents a sort of cornerstone of the
modern intellectual property order. By making copyright automatic and
recognizing the existence of moral rights, it opened up the path for granting
rights-holders a far better service then that given to their own public. Within
the common law tradition, which was in those times still reluctant to criticize
the "public sphere," the most outstanding example of this new trend was offered
by Mark Twain, who revealed himself as one of the fiercest supporters of the
strongest copyright protection possible. Stirred by the extensive piracy his
works suffered overseas, and regardless of the interests of the other parties,
Twain fought tenaciously for the recognition of perpetual protection, becoming
one of the most eager advocates of "property talk." See PAUL MARRET,
INFORMATION LAW IN PRACTICE, 146-50 (2d ed. 2002); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra
note 49, at 57 & 71.
60. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962); Gillian K.
Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1992); Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note
57. For a comparative description of different approaches, see William Fisher,
Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the current technological framework. 61 A result of this new
condition is the dynamic effect that intellectual property
rights have had on the market structure of the fields
involved. They have significantly modified or conflicted
with the original competitive process. 62 In other words, they
have shaped the characteristics of the market. So, if the
logic underlying those rights is to remunerate a profitable
idea or an invention with market power, thereby providing
a sort of monopoly, we can also conclude that some
intellectual rights, such as copyright, are unable to resolve
the trade-off between private incentive and social welfare.
On the contrary, they often amplify the inefficiency in
economic systems. 63 Furthermore, the economically efficient
level of copyright protection is not easy to define, especially
in the digital intellectual property debate, because some
intellectual property rights, again such as copyright, relate
to very different creative works that include variable
degrees of creative and artistic expression. 64 Consequently,
a single property regime may not create efficiency in
markets for all of the different products. 65
In the last years, in fact, we have seen a shift from the
idea of a bargain between the public and the author
towards the standard economic model of a right granted in
the measure required to stimulate production, 66 and,
recently, the new approach is towards extensive
61. See Giovanni B. Ramello, Intellectual Property and the Markets of Ideas,
in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, (Jurgen G. Backhaus ed.,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=597482.
62. See id.
63. See Giovanni B. Ramello, Il diritto d'autore tra creativit& e mercato, 1
ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, 37-66 (2001).
64. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT ISSUES
IN DIGITAL MEDIA viii (Aug. 2004), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=
5738&sequence=O.
65. See id.
66. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in
Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 210 (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Landes & Posner,
Economic Analysis, supra note 57, at 335.
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instruments to control access 67  and use. 68  This
transformation has been driven by the influence exerted by
the printing and publishing industry, which in the pre-
computer society had the necessary resources to enable
large-scale reproduction and distribution of works. 69 It
consequently played a key role in the whole process of
spreading culture. 70 The industry secured its monopolistic
aspirations behind the pretext of ensuring their clients
received adequate compensation for their efforts and the
service done for their community. 71 It took advantage of its
role within society and its economic supremacy, and lobbied
for the adoption of regulations granting further control over
works and allowing the creation of an entry barrier for
unwanted competitors. 72
Unfortunately, the digital revolution and the dema-
terialization of works as result of digitization have
67. See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, It's All About Control: Rethinking
Copyright in the New Information Landscape, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 79 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002);
LITMAN, supra note 51, at 80.
68. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 475 (2003) (speculating that an infinite term
of copyright, alternated by renewals, could be efficient); see also WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 210-49 (2003).
69. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 43, at 17.
70. See 1 JOHN TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED
STATES, 245, 220-221 (1972); cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43
IDEA 1 (2003).
71. See Calovi, supra note 54.
72. In 1995, the Clinton Administration's Information Infrastructure Task
Force released a white paper on Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure, where it expressly stated that further protection of
rights-holders' interests was necessary to guarantee the development of the
National Information Infrastructure and that, lacking appropriate control over
their works, authors would have stopped producing and making them available
to the public. INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (1995), available at
http://www.cerebalaw.com/ipnii.txt. For a comment on the paper, see Pamela
Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, 135 (criticizing the
white paper for misrepresenting judicial copyright precedent and extending
copyright protection beyond traditional commercial applications).
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demonstrated that the information product and its method
of delivery are separable. 73 At the same time, they have
brought about a Copernican revolution in the traditional
copyright system, demonstrating its unsuitability to control
recent technological developments.7 4
B. Protecting Digital Intellectual Property
The following question is about the fair means to
protect digital intellectual property. As already seen, the
revolution in information technology and digitalization of
content have produced many new possibilities and
challenges.7 5 First of all, they have determined the
independence of content from the medium. As argued
above, data travels digitally and there is no more need to
aggregate them to a physical carrier.7 6 This has caused a
substantial transformation in the way people can use and
consume information and in the way it is delivered. 77
Secondly, the Internet allows information to be widely
disseminated and readily accessed at incredible speed with
extremely low expense, and to directly connect the source
and the end user without intermediation.7 8 The flexibility of
digital media allows people to easily copy, modify, and shift
them in time and space.7 9 The newly acquired independence
73. See, e.g., STAN DAVIS & CHRISTOPHER MEYER, BLUR: THE SPEED OF
CHANGE IN THE CONNECTED ECONOMY 22 (1998); see also Raymond T. Nimmer,
Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual Property
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 841-42 (1998).
74. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Commentary: Copyright, Contract, and Code:
What Will Remain of the Public Domain?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 78 (2000)
(highlighting the concern that the traditional copyright system could not
guarantee appropriate protection in the digital framework).
75. On the power of technology, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex informatica: The
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV.
553 (1998).
76. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 32.
77. See id. at 39.
78. See CASTELLS, supra note 19; Chircu & Kauffman, supra note 28.
79. Digital media are instruments for the development of innovative
perspectives on both media and culture. They can contribute to our
understanding of social and cultural change. For a detailed analysis of digital
media and their social implications, see DIGITAL MEDIA REVISITED: THEORETICAL
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from the carriers secured by digitalization allows users to
manipulate the information with the consequence that the
"originality" of a work is threatened to be lost. There is no
longer certainty as to what of the primitive product
remains. Digital technologies have transformed the
copyright environment and have given rise to a potentially
huge market for content.80 The advent of broadband
networks, and their capacity to transmit large quantities of
multimedia content at high speeds, emphasizes the
importance of ensuring that digital content is available
under the appropriate conditions to meet the interests of all
stakeholders.8 1 Related to this, technologies are available to
establish the correct incentives for this development.
Incentives include a secure environment for ensuring
remuneration of rights-holders in the context of private
copying, payment for online content, and prevention of
illegal copying.8 2
As a result, many of the intellectual property rules and
practices developed in the physical world are not suitable
for the digital environment, and the issues connected with
digitization of content are improved by the pervasiveness of
the new information infrastructure.8 3
Both the authors' and industry's prerogatives are in a
difficult situation regarding copyright law. Until the advent
of digitalization, it had been possible to ensure control over
copying and distribution of tangible goods, which were by
their nature susceptible to being counted and singularly
identified. The function of copyright was upset by the same
AND CONCEPTUAL INNOVATION IN DIGITAL DOMAINS (Gunnar Liestol et al. eds.,
2003). Recording Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (which gave recognition to the practice of
"space-shifting" of music for personal use).
80. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EEUROPE 2005 ACTION
PLAN: AN UPDATE (2004), http://europa.eu.int/information-society/eeurope/2005/
doc/allabout/com eeuropeen.doc.
81. See id.
82. See Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights
Management: Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 597
(Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003) (illustrating both problems and positive
features of DRM).
83. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at ix.
11292005]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
structure of the new technological framework which
confused the distinction between access and copying,
strictly conditioning the former to the latter.8 4 The whole
process now is indeed substantially different from that
occurring with physical goods. Attempts to exercise the
same level of copying control exercised on the physical
world necessarily imply maintenance of total control over
access, with possible negative repercussions on the free flow
of culture and the users' rights.8 5
Actually, we are in a new phase of capitalism. Its basic
code is no longer ownership of property bought and sold in
markets, but rather access to services leased within
networks of providers and users.8 6 A large number of
modern services are delivered through electronic networks,
and this new phenomenon is not restricted to online digital
content. As pointed out by Jeremy Rifkin, president of the
Foundation on Economic Trends, tangible things-cars,
computers, office buildings, and catalogues-are also
"dematerializing" into services.8 7 Ownership of such things
is becoming a liability, something to outsource. In the new
environment, markets are making way for networks, and
ownership is steadily being replaced by access. Rifkin
explains that we are living in an age where new digital
media constitute a cultural and economic phenomenon, and
where industries and consumers "are beginning to abandon
the central reality of modern economic life-the market
84. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001); Samuelson, supra note 31.
85. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 49, at 152.
86. Digital distribution systems do not involve tangible copies, and access
contracts or mass market licenses are increasingly common methods of
distribution. For a comparative study of this latter aspect within the Italian
scene, see Alessandro Palmieri & Roberto Pardolesi, Gli Access Contracts: Una
Nuoua Categoria per il Diritto dell'Et& Digitale, 7(2) RIV. DIR. PRiv. 265 (2002).
87. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF
HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 74 (2000); see
also DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 6-7. The Foundation on Economic
Trends is a non-profit organization whose mission is to examine emerging
trends in science and technology and their impacts on the environment, the
economy, culture and society. See The Foundation on Economic Trends,
http://www.foet.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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exchange of property between sellers and buyers."88 On the
contrary, he asserts,
Suppliers hold on to property in the new economy and lease, rent,
or charge an admission fee, subscription, or membership dues for
its short-term use. The exchange of property between sellers and
buyers-the most important feature of the modern market
system-gives way to short-term access between servers and
clients operating in a network relationship.8 9
Rifkin then describes the change of theory that the
digital systems establish in the process of protection of the
intellectual property rights. In this digital framework, in
fact, the barrier is not constituted by possession of the
physical medium that encloses the work, but instead by
access to the content. In the new network economy "both
physical and intellectual property are more likely to be
accessed by businesses rather than exchanged."90 In the
digital environment, providers able to collect important
intellectual capital will be also able to wield power and
"control over the conditions and terms by which users
secure access to critical ideas, knowledge, and expertise."9 1
This issue is a new and troublesome trend likely to
have strong implications, in particular, on users' rights,
with special regard to fair use. 92 Fair use is a defense
recognized for certain acts that would otherwise amount to
copyright infringement.93 The defense was introduced to
88. RIFKIN, supra note 87, at 4.
89. Id. at 4-5.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
92. The fair use doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. It is "the precipitate
of a series of decisions, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, in which
federal courts held that conduct seemingly proscribed by the copyright statute
in force at the time did not give rise to liability." William Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1663-64 (1988).
93. Fair use is not an affirmative right but a sort of defense. It is essentially
a safety valve operating in the absence of licensing that can be structured in
different ways but that is recognized by all modern copyright systems. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13-155 to 13-156 (2003). While
common law countries generally recognize a general defense, civil law countries
generally provide a strict list of exceptions, even though at present there are no
2005] 1131
1132 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
balance the interests of opposing parties and to allow the
limited use of intellectual works without having to first ask
for permission. 94
What we are saying is that the economic power is
changing. It is shifting from "a propertied regime based on
the idea of broadly distributed ownership to an access
regime based on securing short-term limited use of assets
controlled by networks of suppliers."95 At the same time,
the legal order will be obliged to shift from ownership to the
access model.96
In the meantime, content providers are confronting
these new problems using and integrating models of
technological protection measures 97 that ensure very high
levels of digital media protection, creating a secure, digital
environment for the production, management, and
distribution of digital content, but with an impairment of a
series of rights traditionally recognized for the consumer.98
pure systems that adhere strictly to any of the above models. See LUCIE M.C.R.
GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 19 (2002). In the
U.S. system there is a strong relation between fair use and free speech. On the
argument, see Netanel, supra note 84; L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Harry N. Rosenfield, The
Constitutional Dimensions of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 790 (1975). For a European perspective, see Hugenholtz, supra note 59.
94. For interpretation and criticism of the fair use doctrine, see Fisher,
supra note 92 and Rosenfield, supra note 93. For an overview of the relationship
between DRM and fair use, see Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use
Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TEC. 41, 48
(2001).
95. RIFKIN, supra note 87, at 6.
96. See id. at 6-7.
97. The term was defined as "any process, treatment, mechanism or system
that prevents or inhibits any of the acts covered by the rights under this
Treaty." World Intellectual Property Organization, Basic Proposal for the
Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic
Conference, at Art. 13(3), (1996), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/diplconf/
pdf/4dc-e.pdf.
98. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 94, at 48; FRED VON LOHMANN, FAIR
USE AND DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE
(IRRECONCILABLE?) TENSION BETWEEN THEM 3 (2002),
http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/cfpfair-use_anddrm.pdf. See also Dan L. Burk,
Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2002) (arguing "that
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Nonetheless, the technological protection measures
arena is, at this time, much more like the Wild West. Even
though technology is becoming highly developed, the
market expansion for these systems is still at an early
stage. 99 While standards continue to reach greater levels of
maturity and adaptation, content companies will most
likely continue to use technological protection measures
without taking care of the problem of interoperability and
users' expectations. 10 0 At the same time, this solution seems
too simple a practice in which technology tries to replace
the law.10
So, the present challenge is to achieve and maintain the
balance, "offering enough control to motivate authors,
inventors and publishers, but not so much control as to
threaten important public policy goals."'1 02
II. DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS AND DEFENSES FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: LEGAL REMEDIES
Despite the reported perplexities around the suitability
of the current rules, which are still based on principles
consolidated in a different technological context, rights
holders and content providers are not prepared to revise, in
the virtual world, the order that, in the real world, has been
shaped for a long time. 10 3
the new anti-circumvention right created by the statute constitutes a type of
exclusive right quite separate from . . . the legal protection provided by
copyright.").
99. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN UNION HIGH
LEVEL GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS: FINAL REPORT 6 (2004),
http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/eeurope/2005/all about/digital rights-
mandoc/040709_hlgdrm_2nd meeting-final report.pdf [hereinafter EU GROUP
ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS., FINAL REPORT]. See generally DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT, supra note 82.
100. See Bechtold, supra note 82, at 609, 630.
101. On this opinion, see LESSIG, supra note 75; Reidenberg, supra note 75;
ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING
INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW (1999).
102. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 2.
103. See John Perry Barlow, Intellectual Property, Information Age, in CoPY
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 37, 39
(Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (remembering Jack Valenti's
attitude).
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When it comes to intellectual property rights, legal
remedies and technological protection measures are
promptly invoked and prepared at record speed. The first
have been introduced to deal especially with the new
problems connected with the virtual world and the
digitization of contents. The technological protection
measures are able to operate autonomously. Nevertheless,
they are often avoidable using circumvention techniques (or
brute force). For these reasons, the new intellectual
property rules have included extraordinary legal protection
especially for technological protection measures, resulting
in a kind of reinforced double protection, one for the
copyrighted content and one for the technological measure
that protects it.104
The consequence is a complete and structured new legal
tool able to prevent, check, and repress harmful actions
against intellectual property rights. The most important
decision in that direction has been made with the WIPO
treaties,10 5 followed by national legislative initiatives. 0 6
104. Some commentators describe this situation as a sort of "paracopyright."
See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 24-25 (1998); Netanel, supra note 84, at 24;
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) [hereinafter, Nimmer, Fair Use]; MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 12A.18[B] n.15 (2003); see
also Severine Dusollier, Some Reflections on Copyright Management
Information and Moral Rights, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377, 382 (2001-2002).
105. It is useful to remember that there are at least two other main
international treaties that are intended to harmonize copyright law among
nations. The first one is the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, adopted in 1886. The other one is the 1994 Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs Agreement).
For a positive comment on the WIPO treaties as "a measured and balanced
response to the digital age," see Thomas C. Vinje, The new WIPO Copyright
Treaty: a happy result in Geneva, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 230, 230 (1997). For
other commentators the treaties represented another step in the
Americanization of world copyright law. For general discussion on the point, see
Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization
and the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in
Regulating Intellectual Property Rights in the Information Age, 21 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 578 (1999); David Vaver, Internationalizing Copyright Law:
Implementing the WIPO Treaties, OIPRC ELEC. J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS (1998),
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0199.html. For a general comment, see also
Howard P. Goldberg, Note, A Proposal for an International Licensing Body to
Combat File Sharing and Digital Copyright Infringement, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
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The official aim of these two treaties was to fix adequate
legal protections and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures.
In 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) adopted the Copyright Treaty. 10 7 In Article 11 it
decreed that contracting parties have to "provide adequate
legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their
rights," and to "restrict acts, in respect of their
performances or phonograms, which are not authorized by
the performers or the producers of phonograms concerned
or permitted by law."'08 The Article, therefore, provides the
adoption of a legal framework to protect technological
means of control over use; for example, copy protection
encryption against circumvention by third parties. In a
quite similar way, Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty declares the same provision. 10 9
L. 272 (2002), and Silke von Lewinski, WIPO Diplomatic Conference Results in
Two New Treaties, 28 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 203 (1997).
106. For the compliance of U.S. law with the WIPO treaties, see Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
107. World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec.
20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]. The list
of signatories of the WIPO Copyright Treaty is available at http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/notdocs/en/wct/treaty-wct_2.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2005).
108. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 107, at art. 11.
109. World Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty]. The list of signatories of the WIPO
Phonograms and Performances Treaty is available at http://www.wipo.int
edocs/notdocs/en/wppttreaty-wpptl.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). The
WIPO Phonograms and Performances Treaty states in Article 18, the
Obligations concerning Technological Measures:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by performers or producers of
phonograms in connection with the exercise of their rights under this
Treaty and that restrict acts, in respect of their performances or
phonograms, which are not authorized by the performers or the
producers of phonograms concerned or permitted by law.
Id. at 86.
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To comply with the WIPO treaties, both Europe and the
United States enacted very similar anti-circumvention
provisions. 110 The new treaties provided the fundamental
background to the efforts of the United States and
European Union to find their solutions to the issues of
intellectual property rights in the digital age. In 1998, the
United States implemented the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (hereinafter DMCA)111 introducing new anti-
circumvention provisions, while, some years later, Europe
enacted Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society (hereinafter EUCD). 112
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the European
Union Copyright Directive
Although with some differences, the two acts strike the
right balance between opposing interests. 113 They pursue
the same aim of creating a safe environment for
transmission of digital information, 114 and they also seem to
reveal the same failures. 115
110. Many commentators have noticed that the adoption of both acts has
been the result of the great content-provider lobbying activity. See, e.g., Rick
Boucher, The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age, in COPY
FIGHTS, supra note 103, at 95, 97; MacQueen, supra note 14, at 213; Burk &
Cohen, supra note 94.
111. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
112. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).
113. See Gregory Hunt, In a Digital Age: the Musical Revolution Will Be
Digitalized, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 181, 193 (2000). President Clinton stated
that the DMCA implemented "[firm] standards, carefully balancing the
interests of both copyright owners and users." President's Statement on Signing
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 2 Pub. Papers 1902 (Oct. 28, 1998). On
the other hand, Frits Bolkestein, Internal Market Commissioner, stressed how
"Europe's creators, artists and copyright industries can now look forward for
renewed confidence to the challenges posed by electronic commerce. At the same
time, the Directive secures the legitimate interests of users, consumers and
society at large." Press Release, European Commission, Commission Welcomes
Adoption of the Directive on Copyright in the Information Society by the
Council (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/01/528&format=PDF&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLang
uage=fr.
114. See Alice Ritchie, Hanging in the Balance: Fair Use for Digital Works, 9
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 33 (2000). The EU Directive wants to "foster the
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At the heart of both acts, as well as at the heart of most
criticisms, are the provisions making illegal the
circumvention of copy-protection technologies in order to
gain access, as well as any activity (production,
distribution, making available, etc.) performed with the
intent to make possible or facilitate such circumvention. 116
Content providers are particularly concerned about the
illegal appropriation of content as it is carried out behind
the backs of rights-holders and prevents them from being
compensated for their works. 1 7  They assert that
technological protection measures have the limited purpose
of preventing unauthorized access to copyright material,
and, assuming they are imperfect, those laws have the
development of the information society in Europe." Eur. Parl. Directive pmbl.
2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 2 (EC).
115. On the failures of DMC, see generally Nimmer, Fair Use, supra note
104, at 739-40; Netanel, supra note 84, at 79.
116. See Severine Dusollier, Tipping the Scale in Favor of the Right Holders:
the European Anti-Circumvention Provisions, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT,
supra note 82, at 462, 466. See also Calovi, supra note 54; Calovi & Lucchi,
supra note 54, at 1032. The DMCA provides that: "No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title", nor shall any person "manufacture, import, offer to the public,
provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof, that (A) is primarily designed or produced for the
purpose of circumventing . . . ; (B) has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent . . . " 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
Under the European Union Copyright Directive:
(1) Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the
circumvention of any effective technological measures, which the
person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable
grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective. (2) Member
States shall provide adequate legal protection against the
manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale
or rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, products or
components or the provision of services which: (a) are promoted,
advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of, or; (b) have
only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent, or; (c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or
performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention
of, any effective technological measures.
Eur. Parl. Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1, 2 (EC).
117. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY,
IFPI:05. DIGITAL MusIc REPORT (2005) [hereinafter IFPI:05 DIGITAL MUSIC
REPORT], http://www.ifpi.com/site-content/library/digital-music-report-2005.pdf.
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effect of keeping users from engaging in illegal activities,
thereby restoring artists' rights. 118
Both the DMCA and the EUCD, in accordance with
their intention to discipline only illegal appropriation,
stipulated specific provisions to use technology protecting
copyrighted work and allow honest users to exercise their
rights. Unfortunately, some commentators have noticed
that, in practice, they both fail in their stated purpose,
obtaining "only" an extremely high level of protection for
authors. 119 Technology, in fact, may not be capable of
distinguishing between legal and illegal uses. 120
The DMCA distinguishes measures controlling access
from those protecting "other rights," stating that the latter
are not compromised.' 2' If at first sight this seems to be a
good balance, unfortunately it is the same structure of
technological protection measures that negates it because,
for users to enjoy "other rights," they first have to gain
access to protected material. 22 But, when this is prevented
by technological protection measures and their
circumvention is expressly criminalized, even the exercise
of legitimate rights may become a crime since technology
cannot detect the animus leading to circumvention, and the
Act provides no defense in such respect.123 In the digital
environment, any attempt at circumvention is criminal and
118. See Ritchie, supra note 114, at 37.
119. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant,
and Possibly Invalid, 22 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 499, 500 (2000); Michael Hart,
The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: An Overview, 24 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 58 (2002); Dusollier, supra note 116.
120. See Robin D. Gross, Copyright Zealotry in a Digital World: Can
Freedom of Speech Survive?, in COPY FIGHTS, supra note 103, at 189, 190.
121. DMCA recognizes that: "Nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
122. See Calovi, supra note 54; Joanna Perrit, Protecting Technology over
Copyright: A Step Too Far, 14 ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
123. The Electronic Frontier Foundation has documented numerous
problems that anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA have caused in the
U.S. for legitimate users of copyrighted works. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: FIVE YEARS UNDER THE DMCA, (Sept.
24, 2003), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintendedconsequences.php. See Calovi,
supra note 54.
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has to be regarded as piracy, even if it is not so in the
physical world. The anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA prevent three categories of transgressions. First, the
DMCA prohibits circumventing technological measures that
prevent access to a copyrighted work. Second, it prohibits
trafficking in devices that can circumvent access controls.
And third, it prohibits trafficking in circumvention devices
for technological measures that protect the copyright
holder's exclusive rights, for example copying and
distribution.124 These anti-circumvention provisions are an
implicit admission that copy-protection technologies are not
perfect. 125
The EUCD, on the other hand, deals with three main
areas:126 reproduction rights, 127 the right of communication, 128
124. For this schematization, see GASSER, supra note 38.
125. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 153; Pamela Samuelson, DRM
{and, or, vs.} the Law, 46 COMM. ACM 41, 42 (2003).
126. For this outline, see EUROPEAN UNION SCADPLUS SERVICE, COPYRIGHT
AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE HARMONISATION OF
CERTAIN ASPECTS (2001), http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126053.htm.
127. Reproduction right:
Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or
prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by
any means and in any form, in whole or in part: (a) for authors, of their
works; (b) for performers, of fixations of their performances; (c) for
phonogram producers, of their phonograms; (d) for the producers of the
first fixations of films, in respect of the original and copies of their
films; (e) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their
broadcasts, whether those broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over
the air, including by cable or satellite.
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
128. Right of communication to the public of works and right of making
available to the public other subject-matter:
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to
authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works,
by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or
prohibit the making available to the public, by wire or wireless means,
in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place
and at a time individually chosen by them: (a) for performers, of
fixations of their performances; (b) for phonogram producers, of their
phonograms; (c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the
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and distribution rights. 129  The Directive also obliged
Member States to provide legal protection against the
circumvention of any effective technological measures
covering works or any other subject-matter. 130 In particular,
it criminalizes circumvention in any respect regardless of
original and copies of their films; (d) for broadcasting organisations, of
fixations of their broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are transmitted
by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted
by any act of communication to the public or making available to the
public as set out in this Article.
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
129. Distribution right:
1. Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the original of
their works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or
prohibit any form of distribution to the public by sale or otherwise.
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community
in respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first
sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is
made by the rightholder or with his consent.
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 4, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
130. Obligations as to technological measures:
1. Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the
circumvention of any effective technological measures, which the
person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable
grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective.
2. Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the
manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale
or rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, products or
components or the provision of services which: (a) are promoted,
advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of, or (b) have
only a limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent, or (c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or
performed for the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention
of, any effective technological measures.
3. For the purposes of this Directive, the expression 'technological
measures' means any technology, device or component that, in the
normal course of its operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in
respect of works or other subject matter, which are not authorised by
the right-holder of any copyright or any right related to copyright as
provided for by law or the sui generis right provided for in Chapter III
of Directive 96/9/EC. Technological measures shall be deemed 'effective'
where the use of a protected work or other subject matter is controlled
by the right-holders through application of an access control or
protection process, such as encryption, scrambling or other
transformation of the work or other subject-matter or a copy control
mechanism, which achieves the protection objective.
Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC).
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the rights it protects, but encourages rights-holders to
voluntarily adopt any measure deemed necessary "to make
available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation...,
the means of benefiting from that exception or limitation"'
131
and invites Member States to ensure compliance. 132 Article
6.1 requires that Member States provide "adequate legal
protection" against the deliberate circumvention of
technological measures, regardless of whether such an act
infringed any copyright. 133
With this Article the Directive introduces a pan-
European legal defense for technological protection
measures, even if its provisions have not been formally
implemented by all of the European Union Member
States. 34 Actually, some of them are currently under
infringement procedure. In fact, even though the Directive
was designed to be implemented by December 22, 2002,
only two Member States (Greece and Denmark) managed to
meet that deadline. By now, eight of the original Member
States have implemented the act.' 35 Among the new
131. "[T]o the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or limitation
and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected work or subject-
matter concerned." Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17-18
(EC). The Article also allows for rights-holders' compliance through
"agreements between rightholders and other parties concerned," namely
through contracts. For a critical overview of the Directive, see Sdverine
Dussollier, Fair Use by Design in the European Copyright Directive of 2001, 46
Comm. ACM 51 (2003).
132. For further discussion on the complex structure of Article 6.4 of the EU
Copyright Directive, see Alvise Maria Casellati, The Evolution of Article 6.4 of
the European Information Society Copyright Directive, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 369, 372-77 (2001).
133. See Dusollier, supra note 116, at 472.
134. For a state of the art as to implementation status at the date of
September 22, 2004, see Urs Gasser & Michael Girsberger, Transposing the
Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of Technological Measures in E. U. -Member
States. A Genie Stuck in the Bottle? (Berkman Working Paper No. 2004-10)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=628007; Silke von Lewinski, Rights
Management Information and Technical Protection Measures as Implemented in
EC Member States, 35 INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 844 (2004).
135. Greece (entered into force on October 10, 2002), Denmark (enforceable
since December 22, 2002), Italy (implemented April 9, 2003), Austria (entered
into force on 1st July 2003), Germany (implemented September 13, 2003),
Luxembourg (implemented April 29,2004), UK (implemented October 31, 2003),
Ireland (implemented January 19, 2004), Netherlands (implemented September
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Member States, just Hungary, Malta, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, and Estonia have transposed it into
national legislation.
The loophole of this provision is that both content
owners and governments are invited but not compelled to
ensure respect of users' rights. 136 The consequence of this is
that the former somehow retain legal power to settle the
rules of the game, just as it is with the DMCA, where at
present the government does not exercise any form of
control over the characteristics of copy-protection tools and
is thus prevented from working towards the establishment
of a certain balance between authors' and the public's
interests. 137
Although the provisions of the two acts take different
approaches to the problem of legitimate access, neither
succeed in solving it, while they both pose high barriers to
uses otherwise legally recognized. For example, "[i]n
contrast to the DMCA, which does not need to list the
exceptions for copyright infringement liability because
these exceptions are well-established by statute and case
law,"'138 the EUCD stipulates a list of exceptions that are
1, 2004). Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 134, at 8. For a comment on the
Italian implementation, see Mario Fabiani, L'attuazione della Direttiva CE su
diritto di autore nella societe dell'informazione. Un analisi comparativa, 74 DIR.
AUT., 331 (2003).
136. Moreover, it has to be stressed how the Directive does not specifically
identify any kind of measure to be taken by developers of technological
protection measures, nor provides for guidelines in case of non-compliance both
in terms of defining the extent of a possible action and the time deemed
reasonable for voluntarily accomplishment. See MacQueen, supra note 14, at
219.
137. Orin S. Kerr, A Lukewarm Defense of the DMCA, in CoPy FIGHTS, supra
note 103, at 163, 168. 2001/29 is part of a wider program started with Directive
2000/31 aimed at preserving the status quo of power of the music industry
through progressively but steadily limiting users' rights. The E-Commerce
Directive 2001/31 obliges ISPs to remove illegal material or promptly inform
authorities about such activities. This responsibility is only relieved when the
ISP is not aware at all of the illegality of activities. Thus, ISPs are forced to
intervene when illegality is proved, and also when it is only presumed. See Enzo
Mazza, Pia facile contrastare il fenomeno della pirateria musicale online,
INTERLEX, May 15, 2003, http://www.interlex.it/copyright/mazza3.htm.
138. Eleanor M. Lackman, Slowing Down the Speed of Sound: A
Transatlantic Race to Head Off Digital Copyright Infringement, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1161, 1177 (2003).
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quite exhaustive. Article 5 of the Directive, for example,
lays down a number of exceptions to the right of
reproduction and the right of communication. At the same
time, contrary to the DMCA, 139 the EUCD does not list
exceptions to the anti-circumvention provision. 140
It has been argued that the DMCA constitutes a fairly
good attempt to respond to the changes determined by
digitalization and that it is still too early to condemn it, as
the success of the Internet as a distribution model is yet to
be determined.14 ' However, what has probably not been
adequately considered is that behaviors that were taken for
granted like making back-up copies of CDs, could now be
criminalized. 142
It is reasonable to assert that a certain balance is
necessary in the protection of rights in order to avoid total
control. The European directive, on the contrary,
139. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-Oj) (2000) (in addition to a limited reverse
engineering exception stipulated in Subsection (f), contains the following
exceptions and exemptions: Subsection (d) grants an exemption from liability
for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions. Subsection (e)
explains that activities of law enforcement, intelligence, and other government
activities are not prohibited by Section 1201. Subsection (g) sets forth
permissible acts of encryption research. Subsection (h) provides limited
exceptions when minors are concerned, to help parental control of children's
internet access. Subsection (i) allows circumvention when personally identifying
information is involved. Subsection () recognizes permitted acts for the purpose
of computer system security testing).
140. See Dusollier, supra note 116, at 475 (remarking that Recital 48 of the
directive states that protection "should not hinder research into cryptography").
141. See Emery Simon, The DMCA: Providing Locks for Digital Doors, in
COPY FIGHTS, supra note 103, at 171. The theory articulated by Simon could be
easily extended to the EU Directive in question, as their scope and implications
are alike.
142. It's allowed under 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) and under Council Directive
91/250/CEE, art. 5(2), 1991 O.J. (L 122/42). Computer programs are always
provided on some storage device (DVDs or CDs). Such storage media are
relatively fragile and it is all too possible that their contents might be
accidentally corrupted or erased. In these situations, it might not seem
irrational for an end user to get a back-up copy of the work with the only
purpose that this will be stored and used in the case that the original copy of
the software is damaged or lost. See LLOYD, supra note 5, at 397. For a brief
overview of anti-circumvention systems in Europe, see Terese Foged, U.S. v.
E.U. Anti-Circumvention Legislation: Preserving the Public's Privileges in the
Digital Age?, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 525 (2002) (with specific reference to
Denmark) and Hart, supra note 119.
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contemplates the most extensive legal protection measures
against circumvention in all of the implementation of the
WIPO treaties. 143 Where technical tools are not effective
enough, the law has to intervene, and vice versa. 144
However, it will be evident in the latter part of this Article
how current technology is capable of delivering high
protection, but legislation has not retreated. 145
The DMCA and the EUCD both seem to have a rather
extreme and unbalanced approach to defending authors'
rights. Legislators have also somehow "amended" their role
of decision making in favor of copyright owners. In both
cases there has not been a predetermined set of rules
embedded into technological controls, and the power to
determine the activities allowed with regard to protected
content has shifted into the hands of their owners,
representing a sort of "paracopyright."'146 In particular, if
the aim of the Directive was the harmonization of the most
troublesome aspects of copyright in the digital framework,
then Article 6 fails because it principally leaves
intervention up to individual Member States. 147 Moreover,
EUCD, as already pointed out, is particularly evasive on
the method of intervention. This uncertainty also persists
in the implementation of legislation of several Member
States. 148 Inevitably there will be differences found between
Member States' implementations, particularly in regard to
the most troublesome issue; the prohibited acts of
circumvention. 149
143. See Dusollier, supra note 116, at 477.
144. John R. Therien, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society:
Toward Preserving Fair Use and the Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 985-990 (2001).
145. See generally Calovi, supra note 54.
146. See Nimmer, Fair Use, supra note 104, at 686.
147. See Perrit, supra note 122, at 4; see also Severine Dusollier, Exceptions
and Technological Measures in the European Copyright Directive of 2001-An
Empty Promise, 34 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 62, 70 (2003) (noting
how the Directive employs a "fair use by design" approach in the field of
copyright exceptions).
148. See Gasser & Girsberger, supra note 134, at 12.
149. Id.
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As has been noted, copyright law has always been
flexible, evaluating on particular occasions what uses are
legal on the basis of some lodestars. People have been
allowed to engage in different behaviors and to face the
consequences of their evaluation mistakes later. Choosing
to determine ex ante, and with precise accuracy, the limits
of fair use would chill spontaneity, deterring the public
from engaging in behaviors that are otherwise legal and
part of their routine.150
Unfortunately, thanks to the laws currently in force,
such as DMCA and EUCD, content owners find themselves
in an extremely strong position as they are offered the
chance to impose their own rules and their own limits on
use and access to digital content, to the point where they
could possibly supplant legal regulations. 151 However, as
these provisions are going to have an effect essentially
relating to the material provided with anti-circumvention
tools, content providers have been forced to look for
different solutions for material released prior to the
development of technological protection.
B. A Current Intellectual Property Challenge: Illegal File
Swapping
Illegal file swapping represents one of the most well-
known and global threats to intellectual property rights
enforcement. Thanks to technology, the content industry
has succeeded in making the removal of content from their
digital supports more complicated, but there is a great new
challenge that remains to be faced. That is the file sharing
software, or peer-to-peer distribution systems.1 52 This kind
of software allows users to freely exchange and distribute
musical files or other copyrighted contents via the Internet.
Because the greater part of these files are protected
from copyright, the majors have initially attached, in vain,
150. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 94, at 60-61.
151. Id. at 50.
152. On the relationship between technological protection measures and
peer-to-peer networks, see Peter Biddle et al., The Darknet and the Future of
Content Protection, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 82, at 344.
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the legitimacy of the MP3 standard. 153 They have then
focused on the file-sharing system. Napster, born in 1999, is
perhaps the most well known of the peer-to-peer systems. 154
The most recent peer-to-peer technology allows online
connected computers to connect together without passing
through a central file server. This creates a type of network
constituted by interconnected computers, with the
possibility to share files stored in single computers.
This kind of communion is possible through the setting
of simple software, the most famous of which has been
Napster. As in the noted judicial story, Napster was the
first to be diffused on a wide area-network.
After the ban of Napster, its clones (i.e., programs
based on the same technique) have spread on the Net with
extreme success. 55 This new software enables Internet
users to share music files and other types of files without
such data being stored on a central server, so without the
hybrid architecture of Napster. 56 Technically, through
153. In 1998 the Record Industry Association of America (RIAA) sued
Diamond Multimedia, manufacturer of the first portable MP3 player, with the
purpose to hinder the distribution of MP3 music format. In this case the judge,
considering the fair use doctrine, recognized the right of consumers to copy, and
therefore to transform the CD into musical files. At the same time he recognized
the right to produce instruments that make it possible. Recording Indus. Ass'n,
Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631-32 (C.D.Cal.
1998), aff'd, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
154. For a Napster case summary, see Lisa M. Zepeda, A&C Records, Inc. u.
Napster, Inc., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 71 (2002). For a full coverage of Napster's
history, see also ALDERMAN, supra note 39; TREVOR MERRIDEN, IRRESISTIBLE
FORCES: THE BUSINESS LEGACY OF NAPSTER & THE GROWTH OF THE UNDERGROUND
INTERNET (2001).
155. At present, some of the most popular sharing programs are: eDonkey,
Kazaa, WinMX, LimeWire, Morpheus, BearShare, Gnutella, etc. For a detailed
analysis of the current framework, see GARTNER, G2 & THE BERKMAN CENTER
FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL
MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD, (2003) http://cyber.law.harvard.eduhome/
uploads/254/2003-05.pdf.
156. Napster was found liable for vicarious copyright infringement because
the court determined that it does have the ability to supervise and control its
users. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022-23 (9th Cir.
2001). It also derived a direct financial benefit through the infringing activity.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. In fact, "Napster's Achilles' heel was that it retained
a trace of the client-server model" by depending on a centralized file server.
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these programs, the download and upload of files happen
directly from one user's computer to another's. To
commence the exchange of data, all that is necessary is to
install one of these software packages and identify a special
directory in which all the available files to share are stored.
A peer network is created between all the users who
install the same software, in which every computer
operates, at the same time, as both client and server. This
means that the sharing of the data does not happen
through a central file server, but, on the contrary, through
the sharing permissions established by every single user.
Peer-to-peer networks are the result of a large number of
individual connections among couples of computers. For
just this reason, in a peer-to peer net, all the computers can
be considered client and file servers. In effect there is not a
dominant file server, and all the positions are shaped to
function in a work-group context. At the same time, every
user is the administrator of his client, with the facility to
decide autonomously whether to share a resource with the
others or not.
In a network so constituted, to recover a file stored by
another user it is necessary to digitize the name of the file
in the search interface arranged by the software and to
start the screening of items possessed by the other peers.
The query is submitted to all the other peers to verify the
presence of the files in their shared directories, and to
confirm, in positive cases, consent to the download.
If existing laws have allowed the end of Napster, it is
highly unlikely for rights-holders to obtain the same result
with the new decentralized networks (second and third
peer-to-peer generations). This is because it is the same law
that prevents it. Consequently, the only chance they have to
find a way around the problem is to rely on other parties
not directly involved in the "game," like ISPs, cable
operators and telephone companies, to make file sharing
more difficult and to directly target single downloaders. 157
Kurt Kleiner, Free Speech, Liberty, Pornography: The Internet and Peer to Peer
Networking, 169 NEW SCIENTIST 32, 33 (2001).
157. For alternative solutions to the problem of the peer-to-peer, see
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE
OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) and Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L.
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DMCA provisions, in fact, were enacted in a period of
server-based rather than peer-to-peer network distribution
As a result, it is now very complicated for a rights-holder to
prosecute unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
materials by suing the enabling file-sharing services. 158
Furthermore, the DMCA immunizes service providers,
telecommunications companies and Internet search engines
from liability under the Copyright Act for certain activities
related to the transmission of infringing material online if
they satisfy some requirements designed to safeguard
copyright holders' interests. 159 The consequence is that the
content industry has tried to attack individual file-sharers
as well. On the other hand, EU law, until now, had left
much more discretion to Member States about the
protection of non-commercial illegal file swapping. It is
indisputable that the approval of the recent Directives 160
could change this condition, with the possibility of having
lawsuits against individual file-sharers in Europe as
well. 161 Of course, these types of lawsuits could have only a
deterrent effect on potential infringers. 162 A final change in
& TECH. 1 (2003) (proposing to legalize peer-to-peer networks and replace the
lost revenues with a tax on hardware and internet service). See also Lionel S.
Sobel, DRM as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 667-68 (2003) (proposing another way to assure
remuneration for rights-holders: a model whereby ISPs act as digital retailers);
see Charles Mann, The Year the Music Dies, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 90, available
at http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/l1.02/dirge.html.
158. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 64, at 18.
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). For a discussion of this issue, see Douglas
Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 401-02 (2003).
160. Council Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC); Council Directive
2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16 (EC). See infra Part II.C.
161. A first wave of legal actions has already affected Germany, Italy, and
Denmark in March 2004. In Italy, thirty people have already been charged with
copyright infringement, while computers and files have been seized as evidence.
In Denmark, 120 people have been sent civil demands asking them to stop
illegal file-sharing and to pay compensation or face legal action. See Europe's
Song-Swappers Face Court, BBC NEWS (World ed.), Mar. 30, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3581935.stm.
162. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004).
Lemley and Reese assert that lawsuits against final users could be a good
solution: in fact, according to their opinion:
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consumer behavior may be possible when the content
industry is able to provide a legal alternative to illegal peer-
to-peer networks. 163
As pointed out in a recent report of the International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), when the
supply of music available digitally proliferates it could
compete with piracy.164 The report reviews the progress
made in the digital music landscape in 2004.165 The number
of online sites where consumers can buy music legally has
now hit more than 230, up from 50 a year ago, with record
companies licensing the bulk of their active catalogue for
download, totaling over one million songs-more than
doubling the amount of available repertoire within one
year. Furthermore, paid downloads went up more than
tenfold to over 200 million. Services like iTunes and the
new Napster have become household names
internationally, and many other national sites are
specializing in local repertoire.
This indicates, again, that the lawsuits against peer-to-
peer networks did not bring positive results despite the
thousands of claims and other terror campaigns. On the
contrary, the increase and proliferation around the world of
services offering digital music have established a new
market and new business models. Consumers have
welcomed these new initiatives, and their attitudes to
digital music are changing. Pay-per-downloads and
subscription services are the real weapons to control music
piracy, whereas fighting the problem of Internet piracy with
[C]opyright owners sue facilitators online because it is cheaper and
easier for them than suing direct infringers. Cheaper and easier does
not necessarily mean more efficient, however. The shift toward suing
facilitators who are further and further removed from the act of direct
infringement imposes substantial social costs on both legitimate users
and on innovation, costs that the copyright owners do not have to bear.
Id. at 1434. The answer that they offer to the question "is to change the
economics of targeting direct infringers" by enforcing "civil and criminal
copyright statutes against high-volume uploaders." Id.
163. See Biddle et. al., supra note 152. See generally Lemley & Reese, supra
note 162.
164. See IFPI:05 DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 117.
165. Id.
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more restrictive protection of content would only contribute
to change the traditional balance of public and private
rights.
C. Intellectual Property Enforcement: The New European
Pattern
Another troublesome aspect of intellectual property
rights in the digital environment concerns the rules of
enforcement and the application of technical protection
measures or digital rights management systems
(hereinafter DRMs or DRM), used to secure digital content
and also to manage individual users' behavior.166
On April 29, 2004 the Council of Ministers of the
European Union adopted Directive 2004/48/EC on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 167 This new
Directive obliges all Member States to apply "effective,
proportionate and dissuasive" measures, procedures, and
remedies against piracy and counterfeiting, offering a strict
defense to violations. 168 The rationale for that statement
166. See infra Part III.
167. Council Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EC). For detailed
information on this Directive,, see Enforcement of Intellecual Property Rights,
http://www.europa.eu.int/commlinternal market/enlindprop/piracy/index.htm
(last visted Dec. 1, 2005). For critical comments, see Ryan Bates,
Communication Breakdown: the Recording Industry's Pursuit of the Individual
Music User, a Comparison of US and EU Copyright Protections for Internet
Music File Sharing, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 229 (2004); Rico Calleja, The IP
Enforcement Directive, 10 CoMP. & TELECOMM. L. REV. 55 (2004); David Ellard,
The EU's IPR Enforcement Directive: origin, key provisions and future of the
EU's IPR Enforcement Directive, 3 COMPUTER L. REV. INT'L 64 (2004); Peter
Groves, The proposed EC Directive on Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 25 Bus. L. REV. 149, 151 (2004); Annette Kur, The Enforcement
Directive-Rough start, happy landing?, 35 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND
COPYRIGHT L. 821 (2004); Charles-Henry Massa & Alain Strowel., The Scope of
the Proposed IP Enforcement Directive: Torn between the Desire to Harmonise
Remedies and the Need to Combat Piracy, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 244
(2004); Michael Veddern, The Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC-A Further
Step in the Harmonization of IP Laws in Europe, 16 IPR HELPDESK BULLETIN 4-
5 (2004), http://www.ipr-helpdesk.org/newsletter/16/pdf/ENIN16_.EN.pdf; Rogier
Wezenbeek, Balancing Consumer and Rightholders' Interests in- and outside
European Union (Jun. 2004), www.ipa-congress.com/prog/work/download/
Wezenbeek.pdf.
168. The Member States will have to implement the Directive by April 28,
2006. Council Directive 2004/48, art. 3., 2004 O.J. (L 157) 61 (EC).
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appears in the "Recital" sections. The European legislator
asserts that enforcing intellectual property rights is
necessary because without effective protection, "innovation
and creativity are discouraged and investment
diminished.' ' 169 In this direction it is therefore necessary to
ensure that "the substantive law on intellectual property..
is applied effectively in the Community" because
enforcement is "of paramount importance for the success of
the Internal Market."170 Besides, the European legislator
has pointed out how "in the Member States, and despite the
TRIPS Agreement, 171 there are still major disparities
regarding the means of enforcing intellectual property
rights."' 72 In particular, the legal instruments for applying
provisional measures used to preserve evidence, the
calculation of damages, or the instruments for applying
injunctions, vary widely from one Member State to another.
In fact, "[i]n some Member States, there are no measures,
procedures and remedies such as the right of information
and the recall, at the infringer's expense, of the infringing
goods placed on the market."'173
After reading these main purposes, it would be difficult
for any objective commentator to avoid the comparison to
some of the dispositions of the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, that are utilized in the United States by
organizations such as the RIAA to collect personally
identifying information on file sharers with the intention to
prosecute any individual responsible for copyright
infringement. 174
169. Council Directive 2004/48, Recital3, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 46 (EC).
170. Id.
171. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/t-agmOe.htm. This agreement is
an attempt to narrow the gaps in the way intellectual property rights are
protected around the world, and to bring them under common international
rules. It establishes a minimum level of protection that each government has to
give to the intellectual property of fellow WTO members.
172. Council Directive 2004/48, Recital 7., 2004 O.J. (L 157) 48 (EC).
173. Id.
174. According to Robin Gross, the director of civil liberties group IP Justice,
the Directive "[C]reates a broad new 'Right of Information' which requires
2005] 1151
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Actually,
[u]p till now, the action taken by the European Community ... in
the field of intellectual property has focused mainly on the
harmonisation of national substantive law and the creation of a
unitary right at Community level. Certain national intellectual
property rights, for instance, have been harmonised, such as trade
marks, designs, patents for biotechnological inventions, and
certain aspects of copyright and related rights. . . . While the
gradual harmonisation of substantive law on intellectual property
rights has promoted the free movement of goods between the
Member States and has made the rules applicable more
transparent, the means of enforcing intellectual property rights
have not yet been subject to any harmonisation. 1 75
For example, the rapidly growing piracy of intellectual
property rights and production of counterfeit goods, as well
as the infringement of intellectual property in general, are
constantly increasing phenomena that currently have
international diffusion and pose a critical threat to national
economies. 176 The national disparities existing in the
measures and procedures of enforcing intellectual property
rights could support these phenomena in the European
internal market. "In other words, counterfeited and pirated
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to disclose personal information about their
customers to recording industry executives for civil prosecution of Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) file-sharing and other activities. Similar subpoena powers, created under
the notorious US Digital Millennium Copyright Act" even if the power assigned
by the directive could be much wider because it "applies to all types of
intellectual property infringements, not just copyrights." ROBIN GROSS, EU
PASSES DANGEROUS IP LAw, DESPITE MEP's CONFLICT OF INTEREST "MIDNIGHT
KNOCKS" BY RECORDING INDUSTRY EXECUTIVES GET GO-AHEAD (2004),
http://www.ipjustice.org/CODE/release20040309_en.shtml [hereinafter IPjustice].
175. EUROPEAN UNION SCADPLUS, ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2004), http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/126057a.htm.
176. Copyright, trademark and design industries are all affected by
intellectual property theft, but practically no product is unaffected by these
illegal practices. Contrary to what is thought, not only music, movies, software
and other protected contents but also food and beverages, pharmaceuticals,
watches, apparels, cigarettes and cosmetics are popular targets of
counterfeiters. See Telecom Liberalization Can Benefit All Citizens, AGIP
Bulletin June 2004, 5 available at http://www.agip.comlbulletin-sub.aspx?year=
2004&month=6&lang=en. The first Global Congress on Combating
Counterfeiting has estimated that the value of counterfeited and pirated goods
at over C. 500 billion annually. The First Global Congress on Combating
Counterfeiting, World Customs Organization Headquarters, Brussels (May 25-
26, 2004), http://www.akjassociates.com/wco2004/website.asp?page=declaration.
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products are more likely to be manufactured and sold in
those countries that are less effective than others in
combating counterfeiting and piracy."177
In practice, with the adoption of the Directive, the
TRIPS provisions on enforcement of intellectual property
rightsl 78 -"the cornerstone of international law on
enforcement of intellectual property"I79-are transposed
into European law even if, arguably, they go beyond the
same TRIPS rules on enforcement. 8 0 In fact, the Directive
implements at a community level "certain so-called 'best
practice' measures currently in operation in one or more
Member States."18 ' The harmonization is not limited to
specific sectors of intellectual property rights, but can be
applied to any sort of infringement of intellectual property
rights with the problem that within Member States the
concept of IPRs is often different, and the Directive never
provides a definition of them. 8 2 So, if from one perspective
the aims of the Directive seem to be positive both for rights-
177. See EUROPEAN UNION SCADPLus, supra note 175.
178. TRIPS art. 41-50 & 61.
179. Ellard, supra note 167, at 66.
180. The agreement states that governments have to ensure that
intellectual property rights can be enforced under their laws, and that the
penalties for infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The
measures must be fair and equitable, and not extremely complicated or costly.
TRIPS art. 41.2. They should not require irrational time-limits or unwarranted
delays. TRIPS art. 41.2. People involved should be able to ask a court to review
an administrative decision or to appeal a lower court's ruling. TRIPS art. 42.
The agreement illustrates in some detail how enforcement should be handled,
including rules for obtaining evidence, TRIPS art. 43, provisional measures,
TRIPS art. 50, injunctions, TRIPS art. 44, damages, TRIPS art. 45, and other
penalties, TRIPS art. 46. It also statues that courts should have the right,
under certain conditions, to order the disposal or destruction of pirated or
counterfeit goods. TRIPS art. 59. Wilful and malicious trademark counterfeiting
or copyright piracy on a commercial scale should be criminal offences. TRIPS
art. 61. For other details, see Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement,
World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm7_e.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2005).
181. Ellard, supra note 167, at 65; see also Veddern, supra note 167, at 4.
182. For this and other criticisms, see ITALIAN MINISTER OF INNOVATION AND
TECHNOLOGIES: DEPARTMENT FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT ON
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 42-43 (2004), http://www.innovazione.gov.it/ita/
normativa/pubblicazionildigitaLrightsmanagement.shtml. See also Kur, supra
note 167, at 823.
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holders and consumers, we cannot hide some critical points
of view. It is indubitable that the main purpose of the act is
the reduction of the discrepancies and distortions in
national laws. 8 3 It is also indubitable that the dispositions
provided will encourage freedom of movement and protect
fair and equal competition in the internal market,
increasing a safer environment for new investment in
innovation and creation. It is also possible that in this new
legal framework there is something positive for the
consumers who are often damaged by the counterfeited and
pirated products. 8 4 "These activities may also pose a real
threat to the health of the consumer (counterfeit medicines)
or to his safety (counterfeit toys or parts for cars or
aircraft).' ' 8 5 But, the Directive offers to consumers merely
an outward gift ("timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" Laocoon
admonished in front of the Trojan Horse 8 6) because the
disadvantages are more severe than the advantages. Some
of the most controversial aspects of the Directive, in fact,
183. According to the official press release of the Commission, the main
objectives of the Directive are: a) to create a level playing field for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights in different EU countries, by
bringing enforcement measures into line across the European Union, especially
in those countries where the enforcement of intellectual property rights is
currently weakest; b) to establish a general framework for the exchange of
information between the responsible national authorities; c) to maintain a
balance between helping holders of intellectual property defend their rights and
protecting users from unfair litigation (so-called rights of due process). Press
Release, Proposed Directive on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/03/20&for
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Dec. 1,
2005) (discussing MEMO/03/20 Brussels, Jan. 30, 2003).
184. Is important to underline that,
[c]ounterfeiting and piracy are generally accompanied by deliberate
cheating of the consumer as to the quality he is entitled to expect from
a product bearing, for instance, a famous brand name, since counterfeit
or pirated products are produced without the checks made by the
competent authorities and do not comply with minimum quality
standards. When he buys counterfeit or pirated products, the consumer
does not in principle benefit from a guarantee, after-sales service or
effective remedy in the event of damage.
EUROPEAN UNION SCADPLUS SERVICE, supra note 175.
185. Id.
186. "1 fear the Greeks, even when they bring gifts." VERGIL, AENEID, Book
II, line 49 (Oxford Univ. Press 1969).
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start by setting out various obligations necessary to
establish the infringement of an intellectual property right,
such as provisions on evidence and the protection of
evidence.' 8 7 Articles 6 and 7 try, specifically, to solve the
problem of the control of evidence in intellectual property
infringement cases. Usually the evidence in these cases is
under the control of the infringer himself, and it may be
difficult for the plaintiff to produce prima facie evidence of
the infringement.18 8 So, Article 6.1 stipulates that the
competent judicial authorities, on particular occasions, may
order that reasonably available evidence, sufficient to
support a claim, could be presented by the opposing party.
According to Article 6.2, Member States should also take
such measures as are necessary to enable the responsible
authorities to order, upon application by a party, and only
for infringements committed on a commercial scale, the
communication of banking, financial or commercial
documents under the control of the opposing party.
Meanwhile, Article 7 sets out provisional measures to
preserve evidence, which are enforceable when there is a
demonstrable risk of intellectual property rights
infringement, and even before the commencement of
proceedings on the merits of the case.
Article 8 of the Directive stipulates a right of
information, in particular circumstances, allowing judicial
authorities to order certain persons to provide information
on the origin of the goods or services which are thought to
infringe an intellectual property right for commercial
purposes. In addition, it provides provisional and
precautionary measures in Article 9.1, such as seizure of
alleged infringing goods or the blocking of the bank account
and other assets of the alleged infringer in Article 9.2.
Other measures, resulting from a decision on the merits of
the case, could be the destruction, recall, or final removal
from the market of the infringing goods as discussed in
Article 10.
187. See European Commission, IPR Enforcement Directive Gets Go-Ahead:
Counterfeiting and Piracy, SINGLE MARKET NEWS, July 2004, at 10, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/smn/smn34/indexen.htm.
188. See Ellard, supra note 167, at 68; Kur, supra note 167, at 825; Veddern,
supra note 167, at 5.
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Even if the current Enforcement Directive could
represent "a step on the path toward a comprehensive
Community framework of legislation both substantive
intellectual property law and its enforcement," we cannot
hide several other questionable aspects.18 9 One of the points
most criticized in relation to this new Directive is connected
to the limits of the application of the measures provided for
enforcement. In particular, there was heated discussion
connected to peer-to-peer file sharing and the possibility of
limiting application of these measures to acts carried out on
a commercial scale.190 As pointed out in Recital 14 of the
Directive, acts carried out on a commercial scale are those
executed for direct or indirect economic or commercial
advantage. Therefore, this would normally exclude acts
carried out by end consumers acting in good faith.
Unfortunately, only the original proposal of the Directive
was in this direction, limited to infringement committed for
commercial purposes which generate significant harm to
the rights-holder. 19
The final version of the Directive, that is, the one
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, does
not insist that Member States apply penalties to the
individual file swapper, but gives them wide discretion. 192
189. Ellard, supra note 167, at 71.
190. For example, in Italy, the so-called Decree "Urbani"-"Interventions to
oppose the illegal electronic circulation of audiovisual material, and to support
film and entertainment activities" (Decreto 72/04), gave rise to a fervent
controversy because, in its very first version, it distorted the distinction
between violating copyrights for commercial and for non-commercial purposes,
overturning the previous legal system. The Decree was converted into law, as
amended by Law No. 128 of May 21, 2004 published in the Official Gazette of
the Italian Republic No. 119 of May 22, 2004, and it went into effect on May 23,
2004. One of the goals of the provision is to fight electronic piracy. In this sense
it was greatly opposed by the Internet Service Provider associations and
telecommunications firms that, while agreeing with its ultimate objectives, felt
that the system of safeguards the decree introduces for digital media copyrights
is particularly repressive and disproportionate. Recently the law has been
amended again by the law No. 43 of 31 March, 2005 published in the Official
Gazette of the Italian Republic No. 75 of April 1, 2005. For some criticism of
this law, see Calovi & Lucchi, supra note 54.
191. See Ellard, supra note 167, at 67; Veddern, supra note 167, at 4.
192. See Kur, supra note 167, at 821. The final version of the Directive, in
fact, includes only civil measures and remedies while the proposal to harmonize
criminal proceedings and penalties was rejected.
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In the U.S. system, on the contrary, rights-holders and
Internet service providers have lobbied on behalf of their
business interests for moving legal liability onto individual
users. 193 It was argued that some DMCA provisions
"reflect[] an early attempt to clarify an ISP's potential
liability for contributory copyright infringement."'194 The
DMCA, in fact, specifies that Internet service providers
cannot be held liable for copyright infringement for either
the transmission or the storage of copyright-infringing
materials on their networks if they follow the requirements
laid out by the statute.1 95 The absence of these "safe-harbor"
provisions in the EU system may push liability against
ISPs and other intermediaries also, for hosting illegal
content or activities.196 Currently, the problem of liability of
Internet service providers is ruled in detail by Directive
2000/31/EC, also called the E-commerce Directive. 197 This
distinguishes the liability standards that apply to various
193. See Bates, supra note 167, at 248.
194. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 64, at 14.
195. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 159, at 402.
196. See Kur, supra note 167, at 826. One of the most famous European
cases in this direction was LICRA v. Yahoo!, Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris [T.G.I.] [court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2001, available at
http://eff.orgllegal/Jurisdictionandsovereignty/LICRA-vYahoo/20001120_fr-i
ntruling.en.pdf. U.S. court will not uphold French censorship ruling against
U.S.-based company for speech that is legal in the United States: in fact this
ruling contrasts with section 512 of the DMCA and was not enforced in the
United States due to First Amendment concerns. See Marc H. Greenberg, A
Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! Case and the Regulation of Online
Content in the World Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191 (2003); Lackman,
supra note 138, at 1177. The same approach could be found in a German case in
which CompuServe was found liable under German criminal law for the
distribution of child pornography over the internet. See Amtsgericht
Munchen Geschaftsnummer: 8340 Ds 465 Js 173158/95 (1998), available at
http://www.jurawelt.com/gerichtsurteile/strafrecht/AG/1402 (unofficial English
translation available at http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005)). Some similar approaches could also be found in previous
decisions of Italian courts: Tribunale di Napoli, Ordinanza 8 August 1996
(comparing, in terms of liability, a service provider to a newspaper's director), 1
Giustizia Civile, Vol. XLVIII, January 1998 at 259, and, more recently,
Tribunale di Catania, Sentenza 29 June 2004 (distinguishing the liability
for content providers and service providers), available at http://www.
interlex.it/testi/giurisprudenza/ct040 6 2 9 .htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
197. Council Directive 2000/31, On Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic
Commerce in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC).
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online intermediary players, punctually classifying the
liabilities that emerge from activity as a mere conduit,
caching and hosting. 198 On the contrary, the Enforcement
Directive opens new questions and practical consequences
for other types of intermediates. 199
Civil liberties organizations and consumer rights
groups are worried that the Directive could be used by the
recording and content industry to attack users in Europe
much like the lawsuits in the United States. In fact, there is
more than some doubt that the Directive was influenced, at
least in part, by the recent attacks on peer-to-peer and file
sharing music piracy in the United States, and supported
by intense lobbying of the content industry.200 As argued by
John Perry Barlow, the Enforcement Directive does not
seem to be very effective at protecting the interest of
artists, or at least the majority of them. Rather, it seems
more designed to over-protect the interests of those "same
distribution institutions that have preyed on musicians and
songwriters for the last one hundred years."201 Therefore,
there is a real possibility that, even if it seems suited only
for cases involving infringement for commercial purposes, it
will also be used against European consumers for minor
non-commercial infringements. 20 2
198. For a complete overview of the Directive, see Rosa JuliA-Barcel6 &
Kamiel J. Koelman, Intermediary Liability In The E-Commerce Directive: So
Far So Good, But It's Not Enough, 4 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 231 (2000).
199. See Kur, supra note 167, at 826-27 ("As liability of ISPs seems to be
confined in most of the crucial cases to what is set out in the e-commerce
directive, the practical consequences may materialize primarily in the transport
business.").
200. By sheer coincidence, the European Parliament's Rapporteur of the
new intellectual property enforcement directive is Janelly Fourtou, wife of Jean-
Ren6 Fourtou former top manager of Aventis and currently the CEO of Vivendi
Universal, the media giant that is the biggest holder of intellectual property
rights worldwide. See File Swappers Avoid Home Invasion, BBC NEWS (UK ed.),
Mar. 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/3545839.stm.
201. John Perry Barlow, Why Artists Oppose the EU Intellectual Property
Rights Enforcement Directive, http://www.ipjustice.org/CODE/Barlow-stmnt.
html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
202. See IPjustice, supra note 174.
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III. DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS AND DEFENSES FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: TECHNOLOGICAL REMEDIES
As argued above, the extremely fast technological
progress in information technologies has brought about new
legislative and judicial attempts to restructure intellectual
property rights for digital media, trying to balance the
interests of both rights-holders and consumers.
Now, protection of intellectual property rights in the
information society is essentially governed by different
international conventions and the subsequent compliance of
national legislative principles. This legislation backs up the
enforceability of privately generated norms. 20 3 Acts, such as
the DMCA and EUCD, recognize a legal status and explicit
legal protection for "technological measures" and "copyright
management information" hampering unauthorized uses
and determining the conditions for legitimate use.20 4
The transition from analog to digital media has had a
Copernican impact on intellectual property rights,
consumers, and content industries. While in the past analog
era, rights-holders applied physical barriers to control
reproduction and distribution of their goods in order to
prevent unauthorized copying and to enforce intellectual
property law, in this new legal framework, the technological
protection measures have found formal recognition
replacing the old practical barriers. 20 5 This has the relevant
advantage that technology is not subject to any legal limit
and can regulate transactions in a much more powerful
way.20 6 As a result, in order to prevent non-copyright
203. See Elkin-Koren, A Public Regarding Approach to Contracting over
Copyright, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 40, at 191, 192.
204. See Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States
and Europe, 52 Am. J. COMP. L. 323 (2004). These systems are designed to
prevent the easy copying of digital works. Both the acts protect the systems
with a legal regime designed to ensure protection for creative works. See id. at
356. For a description of technological protection measures, their implications
and uses, see Sobel, supra note 157.
205. See LESSIG, supra note 75, at 136; Reidenberg supra note 75, at 567-68.
206. See Jacques de Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of
Contract and Copyright Policies: In Search of a New Global Policy for On-Line
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holders from infringing upon the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder, intellectual property law was amended to
meet the needs of the highly technological world. The
revision of current law, however, is much more difficult and
complicated than in the past. The rapid advance and
indiscriminate use of digital technology to control legally
acquired digital creative works, on one hand could limit
infringing distribution and have effects on innovation and
economy, but on the other it could also have involuntary
negative effects for consumer rights.207
Since the development of the first technical protection
system, technology has taken giant steps. The most recent
measures-very effective in the protection of authors'
rights-have enhanced the feasibility of new business
models, in particular, enabling rights-holders to engage in
differential pricing according to the specific uses made of
their rights. However, the application of these measures is
also one of the most troublesome sources of conflict between
rights-holders and consumers. 20 8
The role technology can hold in protecting intellectual
property varies greatly. It can be used simply to prevent
users from gaining access or engaging in definite uses, like
copying, or it can be used to develop licensing business
models where rights-holders determine at their own
discretion terms and conditions for access and use of their
works and embed these rules in technical devices.20 9 In both
cases it nurtures the amount of control rights-holders exert
over their productions, because, as has already been seen,
Information Licensing Transactions: A Comparative Analysis Between U.S. Law
and European Law, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 239, 251 (2003).
207. For more extensive treatment of the different threats posed by digital
technologies to consumers rights, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Burk & Cohen, supra note 94,
50-51; Lee A. Bygrave, DRM and Privacy. Legal Aspects in the European Union,
in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 82, at 418; Julie E. Cohen, DRM
and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 585 (2003); Samuelson, supra note
137, at 42-45.
208. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, supra note 64, at
11-13.
209. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office be Obsolete in
the Twenty-First Century?, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 61 (1994).
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technology is not subject to any legal limit and is able to
control transactions much more strictly than a contract. 210
There are many expressions currently in use to indicate
the expanding set of technologies and systems designed to
protect content from unauthorized copying and to facilitate
monitoring the use of the products by consumers. 211 The
terms "self-help systems," "Digital Rights Managements
Systems," "Technological Protection Measures," and
"Automated Rights Management" all refer to automated
systems able to protect and manage, individually, the
distribution of digital works.
Prominent among the problems that may be connected
with the use of these systems is the fact that any rights a
consumer may have under copyright law could be replaced
by unilaterally defined contractual terms and conditions in
a sort of commercial agreement between the parties with a
modifying consequence on the balance of rights. 212
Moreover, these means can also individually control users'
behavior presenting a powerful threat to freedom of
expression as well as privacy.213
Generally speaking, these measures are used to
manage rights. According to the context, managing rights
could embrace a system that is used to secure and
distribute protected content or protected media files. In
such a system the rights are defined during the protection
step and issued as a usage license to consumers. Managing
rights could also embrace a system that is used to control
access to an online service and an accounting system that
can track the rights issued and the royalties that are
210. On the power of technology, see Reidenberg, supra note 75.
211. See Adam, supra note 40, at 104.
212. See WILLIAM ROSENBLATT ET AL., DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: BUSINESS
AND TECHNOLOGY 46 (2002); see also Andrea Ottolia, Preserving Users' Rights in
DRM: Dealing with "Juridical Particularism" in the Information Society, 35
INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 491, 496-99 (2004). For comment on
the replacement of a copyright system with a contract-based system, see Niva
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 111 (1997).
213. See Cohen, supra note 207; Gross, supra note 120, at 190. For a
European perspective, see Bygrave, supra note 207.
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associated with those rights.2 14  Essentially, DRM or
Technological Protection measures allow "the smooth,
secure, trusted movement of digital works from creators
and publishers to retailers and consumers." 215 The first step
is always the creation of an original work, then the
"eContent owner can then edit and finish the original work
by aggregating it with other edited works. Utilizing DRM,
publishers then assign rights to a digital work and stipulate
fees and access conditions resulting in a license governing
the exercise of each specific right."216 In this sense, DRM
enables "eTailers to establish prices associated with
different business models and consumers" while at the
same time users can "access digital content with a valid
license, which will trigger an automated process for royalty
payments."217
A. Technological Features to Protect Access and Rights
Control
The inclusion of copy protection devices is a feature of
much digital media. A wide range of techniques are used in
an attempt to guarantee that only the authorized user can
make use of the content. In general, it is possible to classify
two different kinds of technological control measures,
"access control" and "rights control."218
214. See Digital Rights Management Terms, http://www.xrml.org/reference/
xrml terms.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). For a definition of DRM and its basic
elements and features see also generally ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 212.
215. See ContentGuard, XrML: The Technology Standard for Trusted
Systems in the eContent Marketplace (2000), http://www.xpert.co.kr/lcom/
2network/p2p/pds/OWhitePaper.pdf#search='The%20Technology%2OStandard
%20for%20trusted.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. For this distinction, see R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging Access
Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention
Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619 (2003). See also Kamiel J. Koelman & Natali
Helberger, Protection of Technological Measures, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE: LEGAL ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT 165 (P.
Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2000); Ottolia, supra note 212, at 493. As pointed out by
the latter, "access control" measures allow the DRMS to function as a
conditional access system while "rights control" measures allow the user who
has obtained the access to carry out certain uses on it. Id.
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Access control deals with the concept of "who has access
to what," and includes the type and number of operations
that can be executed by users. In other words, access
control measures provide a framework for the definition of
authorization policies.
Rights control limits a user's ability to exercise one of
the rights of the content owner. These distinctions imply,
for example, that those "who circumvent a rights control
will not infringe the copyright owner's rights."219 In this
sense, access controls may enjoy stronger protection than
rights controls, and rights-holders could have more
incentive to use access controls rather than rights controls
in order to obtain the stronger legal protection against
circumvention. 220  However, technological protection
systems could incorporate both types of control.
From a practical point of view, these systems can be
characterized by different technology. Encryption is one of
the basic features. It keeps content secure by scrambling (or
"encrypting") it and preventing it from being read until it is
unscrambled with the appropriate decryption key. 221 It is
also particularly useful in preventing undesired access.
Conversely, once access is gained, encryption provides no
means of controlling how content is used, so that it could be
copied in the decrypted format or passed along, together
with its decryption key, and accessed by unauthorized
users.
219. Reese, supra note 218, at 624.
220. See id. at 641.
221. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 156-58. There are two different
encryption techniques, symmetric-key and public-key. In the former, the same
key used to encrypt content is also used to decrypt it so that the key is universal
and can be widely distributed. Choosing to rely on this technique ensures
higher speed in terms of computer processing, but it is also less secure if
compared to public-key. If the key is intercepted during its transmission to the
recipient and the code is broken, content becomes freely available. Public-key
cryptography relies instead on two different keys, a public and a private one,
the former being used to send content, the latter to decrypt it. Here, possession
of the public key only is not sufficient to gain access to encrypted content.
Generally, symmetric-keys are used to encrypt the message, whilst public-keys
are used to send the key. The symmetric-key is used, for example, for pay-per-
view television. For a full description of encryption technology, see id. at 283-95.
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Digital watermarking is another technique used to
authenticate, validate, and communicate information in
digital media. It enables identification of the source, author,
creator, owner, distributor, or authorized consumer of
digital content. This protection system is based on the
science of steganography or data hiding.222 Invisible data or
information, imperceptible to human senses, are embedded
in a digital media but detectable by appropriate software or
devices. In fact, the invisible signal may include
information about the identity of rights-holders or content
providers, a serial number, the name of the author, or other
information that a particular software or device could read
to establish the exact origin of the digital data.
Even if it could be used for different purposes, like
identifying ownership, authenticating the content's
integrity, ascertaining unauthorized distribution or
publication (fingerprinting), there is no single type of
watermarking capable of satisfying all possible
applications. 223 And, it certainly cannot be used to prevent
production of pirated copies. Programs like web-crawlers
allow extensive searches over the Internet for documents
digitally marked, and even though watermarking cannot
control the use made of digitally marked works nor stop
people from distributing them, unauthorized applications
can be detected. With such evidence, rights-holders are then
222. See generally CHUN-SHIEN Lu, MULTIMEDIA SECURITY: STEGANOGRAPHY
AND DIGITAL WATERMARKING TECHNIQUES FOR PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (2005).
223. See DIGITAL DILEMMA supra note 3, at 296-99. Watermarks can be
either "perceptible" or "imperceptible" by people; "fragile" or "robust." Fragile
watermarking involves marking a file with a key associated to its creator. If the
file has not been altered, using the same key to extract the file should result in
obtaining the original watermark. Otherwise, an error message will be
obtained, meaning that an alteration occurred. Robust watermarking works the
same way but it makes provisions for changes to occur. If any alteration has
occurred, the watermark obtained after using the key to extract the file will
only be "close" to the original. A particular kind of watermarking is
fingerprinting. Here, digital objects are embedded with further information
identifying the recipient. If the file is distributed without authorization, by
extracting the original fingerprint it is possible to detect its original source.
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enabled to sue individuals for intellectual property rights
infringement.224
Finally, another type of protection measure is
constituted by "trusted systems." These systems strengthen
content protection, involving both software and hardware in
the control process by building security features like
cryptographic signatures in personal computers. This
solution would probably lead users to lose control over their
machines, but it would also make copying more easily
controlled by verifying that users are trustworthy.225
Trusted systems are essentially based on the principle of
confidence between participants in an exchange, with the
understanding that all parties concerned will accept certain
rules. These rules are disposed to be related primarily with
usage rights, such as the formats and the purposes for
which the content may be used. In the case of encrypted
and digitally signed CDs or DVDs, for example, in addition
to this protection the same CD or DVD players could also be
equipped with copy protection technology, so that they have
to be played with a specific device able to verify the digital
signature.226
224. Content owners also rely on labeling, which provides documents with a
logo or a notice warning viewers about the uses allowed by the rights-holder. Id.
at 299-300. Due to their purpose, they are generally visible, susceptible of
alteration and do not offer enforcement of usage terms. Id. at 300.
225. See Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and
Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1254-55 (2000). A step in this direction
has already been made by the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)
while Microsoft is currently preparing to release a version of Windows that
would co-operate with TCPA technology. For a general discussion of TCPA, see
DAVID SAFFORD, THE NEED FOR TCPA (2002), http://www.research.ibm.com/gsal/
tcpalwhy-tcpa.pdf. A possible negative effect of such systems is little control of
consumers over their computer, as well as invasion of privacy and blockage of
innovation. Weinberg, supra at 1254-55.
226. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 167-71. A further example of a
device embedded with "trusted system" is connected with Content Scrambling
System (CSS). This is technology used by motion picture studios to encrypt
DVD contents and to code contents with a geographic region feature. Only
licensed devices-DVD players and DVD ROM drives, different for every region
-can decrypt and play the DVD contents. The CSS decryption licenses, which
permit consumer equipment manufacturers to embed keys to unlock the
decrypted contents to play on their devices, require that content be sent only to
authorized outputs. On the CSS technology and the Universal City Studios v.
Corley lawsuit, see Nicola Lucchi, II Caso DeCSS: tra Libert& di Manifestazione
del Pensiero e Diritto d'Autore, 3 STUDIUM IURiS 381-88 (2002).
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B. How Technological Solutions Could Govern Users'
Behavior
Technological protection measures have a series of
upsetting and unexpected uses. For example, most software
programs are subject to End User License Agreements
(hereinafter EULAs), and the common consumers' attitude
towards EULAs is to agree without reading them. But a
EULA is a classic example of a contract of adhesion that
does not come as the result of a negotiation between the
vendor and the user.227 A mass-market software company
writes the EULA to license copies of its goods, so it can
restrict their customers' rights of transfer and use.
Essentially, the only possibility for the end user is to take it
or leave it. Well, DRM can be used to enforce EULA clauses
or even policies that are not legally enforceable.
Generally, the use of technological protection measures
could increase the power of rights-holders to set excessive
conditions on the users. The combination of a contract and
technological protection measures could represent a
powerful mixture for a fully automated system of secure
distribution, rights management, monitoring, and payment
for protected content.228 So, DRM, de facto, could also be
seen as the imposition of "unilateralO contractual terms
and conditions. ' 229 When users access content protected by
a technological protection measure, the content provider, in
practice, imposes a contractual provision by a click-through
or click-wrap agreement. 230
227. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002) (remarking on
the easy adaptation of traditional contract law to electronic transactions). On
EULA, see John J.A. Burke, Reinventing Contract, 10 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J.L. 2,
18 (2003), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/vlOn2/burkelO2_text.html;
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market
Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996).
228. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Electronic Commerce: An
Introduction, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 218, at 1, 2.
229. de Werra, supra note 206, at 244.
230. Under this legal fiction, the consumer can agree to the terms of
contract in a very similar way to the shrink-wrap license. On the latter form of
licensing agreement, see Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995). Some commentators argue that, even if
"DRM usage contracts are usually made over the Internet and are therefore not
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"In this sense, technological protection measures can be
considered a condition of the widespread use of contract-
based distribution models on the Internet. '231 Therefore,
the inequity that these measures introduce in the different
positions should be considered by policymakers if they want
to support this kind of business model.232  Some
commentators have reasonably argued that, unless the
legislature clarifies the issue, "the copyright regime would
succumb to mass-market licenses and technological
measures. '233  It will be necessary, for example, to
reconsider the norms protecting consumers and weak
contracting parties, particularly dealing with a contract
able to impose unlimited restrictions on the contents. As
already done in other similar situations, it is necessary to
rebalance the function of copyright law, or rather, to
identify the limits of contracts as means of exploiting
intellectual property rights. Otherwise, the risk is that
consumers will lose all the privileges granted under its
regime. 234
One of the consequences of the use of technological
protection measures is that any rights that consumers may
have under copyright law could be replaced by a commercial
agreement between the parties with a modifying conse-
quence on the balance of rights. 235 There is an essential
contradiction: if the technological measures against copying
are legal, and, at the same time, the private copy is legal
too, what kind of solution is possible? The issue is that
users are not allowed to eliminate the legal protection to
shrink-wrap licenses in the strict sense . .. [they could be] analogized ... to
their online counterpart: the so-called 'click-wrap' licenses." Bechtold, supra
note 204, at 343 (remarking also that "[miost DRM usage contracts are such
click-wrap licenses"). On the electronic contracting environment, see Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 227, at 464.
231. de Werra, supra note 206, at 250.
232. For a European perspective on whether copyright limitations and
exceptions can be contracted or overridden through contract law or
technological protection devices, see Lucie M.C.R. Guibault, Contracts and
Copyright Exemptions, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note
218, at 125, 149-52.
233. Id. at 160.
234. de Werra supra note 206, at 244.
235. ROSENBLATT ETAL., supra note 212, at 46.
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make their legal copies. In fact, even when consumers have
the right to make private copies, technological protection
measures can effectively hinder consumers in exercising
these rights. The legal environment seems to support this
bad practice because rights-holders are not legally obliged
to assist a user in exercising his right of copying for private
use. As a consequence, that right becomes illusory.236
A possible solution could be to see DRM systems as
means to put into effect a contract between the content
provider and the end user in a very similar way to "shrink-
wrap licenses" for computer software. 237 The issue will be to
set the limit on infringement, if it could be identified as a
simple contractual infringement concerning civil law of a
private nature, or as a criminal offense. It is necessary to
keep in mind the fact that the problem of intellectual
property exceeds simple private agreements. It is essential
to mention explicitly the contractual obligations of the
content user.
Transactions supervised and enforced by technological
protection measures in addition to this type of contract
could alter the balance of rights between rights-holders and
consumers. 238 In particular, in the U.S. systems, "some
types of technologically-enforced rights transactions
supersede the limits of fair use and the first sale
doctrine."239 Nevertheless, DRM, when seen as a contract,
could be used to protect content that is not subject to
intellectual property rights protection, and could also erect
236. See European Consumers' Organisation, Digital Rights Management,
BEUC/X/025/2004, Sep. 15, 2004, http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/
eeurope/2005/all about/digital-rights-man/doc/beuc.pdf [hereinafter DRM-
BEUC Position Paper]. See also Dusollier, supra note 147, at 71.
237. See Bechtold, supra note 204, at 342 (arguing that DRM usage
contracts are employed to establish contractual privity between providers and
individual consumers in a mass market protecting content not only by
technology, but also by contract). On the increasing use of licensing, see DIGITAL
DILEMMA, supra note 3, at 34.
238. See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of
Biological "Lock-Out" Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1564 (2004) (observing
that by implementing technical constraints on access to and use of digital
information, a copyright owner can effectively supersede the rules of
intellectual property law); ELKIN-KOREN, supra note 212.
239. ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 212, at 46. The first sale doctrine is
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1997).
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barriers not only at the entrance level.240 DRM has the
potential to set up an exit barrier because it does not know
when copyright terms expire. Therefore it exercises the
same control on works that should exit copyright,
hampering their entry into the public domain and
establishing a de facto unending copyright protection. 241
In general, a content transaction could be identified as
a license or a sale, but the controversial nature of the
distinction between a license and a sale, when applied to
the technology world, could make this doctrinal dispute
more confusing. 242 However, the main difference is that in
the first case the content transaction falls under contract
law while in the second it falls under copyright law.243 In
the U.S. systems, the relationship between copyright law
and contract law is highly debated because copyright is a
federal matter governed by federal law while contract law is
state law, and states cannot limit or expand copyrights
through state law. 244 In the U.S. system the preemption
doctrine is in force. It is a constitutional principle, codified
in 17 U.S.C. § 301, by which Congress may impose its
240. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). In this
case the court upheld a shrinkwrap license agreement that would protect the
plaintiffs CD-ROMs of telephone listings from being posted on the Internet
although the Supreme Court had said that this kind of material could not be
protected by copyright. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co, 499 U.S.
340 (1991). On the argument and for examples of contractual terms that conflict
with copyright law, see Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 125-26, 132
(1999). See also Elkin-Koren, supra note 212.
241. See Therien, supra note 144, at 994.
242. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs,
Spokes, and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337, 1345-46
(1994) (discussing distinctions between sales of tangible goods and licenses of
intangible software under U.C.C. Article 2). See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES § 6:1 (3d ed. 1997).
243. See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 212, at 48 (arguing that the tension
between copyright and contract law affects the balance that copyright law seeks
to strike).
244. The U.S. system uses the preemption doctrine, i.e., a constitutional
principle codified in 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), stating that copyrighted material is
governed exclusively by this title and it preempts "the common law or statutes
of any State."
11692005]
1170 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
intent to totally or partially supplant state law. 245 In
practice, states do not have the constitutional authority to
legislate on some subject just to save the unifying function
of federal law. In the copyright framework, preemption can
have effect when federal law diverges from state contract
law246 in order to "guarantee[ ] a homogeneous federal
copyright law system that does not leave any vague areas
between state and federal protection. '" 247 This implies that
in the United States this principle could be strictly related
to the contractual extension of copyrights beyond those
granted by the Copyright Act, or the reduction of the rights
that users have conventionally benefited from apart from
contract. 248
In this sense, some commentators assert that
preemption could play an important role in solving the
conflict between contract and copyright law,249 but cannot
and will not solve the problem alone.250
However, the main issue is to decide if DRM could be
seen as a contract between buyer and seller. In this case, in
245. The principle derives from the Supremacy Clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
246. On the relationship between copyright and contract law pre-emption,
see Elkin-Koren, supra note 212; I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright, and
Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995),
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/vlil/hardy.html; Lemley, supra note 240;
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract and
Standardization in the Computer Industry, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1998); see
also Nimmer, supra note 73.
247. Elkin-Koren, supra note 212, at 102 n.45.
248. See Hardy, supra note 246.
249. One of the most eloquent court decisions applying the copyright
preemption doctrine to contract law is the case ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a plain analysis of this decision, see Elkin-Koren,
supra note 212.
250. See Lemley, supra note 240, at 136.
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the U.S. systems, federal copyright law is not involved
because the relation is based on contract law. This also
implies that, after the expiration of copyright, the rights-
holder would no longer have any right under copyright law,
but the contract could still be effective and enforceable
despite the expiration. It is interesting to note that the
problem concerning use of contracts to create a private
copyright protection was already pointed out in the same
DMCA Report. It stated that:
[Tihe movement at the state level toward resolving questions as to
the enforceability of non-negotiated contracts coupled with legally-
protected technological measures that give right-holders the
technological capability of imposing contractual provisions
unilaterally, increases the possibility that right-holders, rather
than Congress, will determine the landscape of consumer
privileges in the future. 251
On the other hand, in the EU system, the tension
between contract law and copyright is less obvious, because
in Europe the regulation of contractual practices in the
matter of copyright is not unusual, even if freedom of
contract is the general rule while contractual restraint is
the exception. 252  However the relationship between
copyright exemptions and usage contracts is still quite
ambiguous. 253 In fact, in addition to the mandatory
provisions of the Directives on computer programs 254 and
251. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, at xxxi-ii (2001),
available at http://www.egov.vic.gov.au/pdfs/sec-104-report-vol-l.pdf. This
report was issued following the DMCA mandate of section 104, to evaluate the
effects of the amendments made by the DMCA on the operation of sections 109
and 117 of the Copyright Act, with regard to digital technologies.
252. For a European point of view on the relation between contract and
copyright law, see Lucie Guibault, Pre-emption Issues in the Digital
Environment: Can Copyright Limitations be Overriden by Contractual
Agreements under European Law, in MOLENGRAFICA N. 11. EUROPEES
PRIVAATRECHT. OPSTELLEN OVER INTERNATIONALE TRANSACTIES EN
INTELLECTUELE EIGENDOM, 225, 226-27 (F.W. Grosheide & K. Boele-Woelki eds.,
1998).
253. See Bechtold, supra note 204, at 366.
254. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, On the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122).
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databases, 255 the same copyright law suggests a "little
guidance for the determination of the validity of a contract
that restricts the lawful exercise of a limitation on
copyright. ' 256 In this context, it is evident in continental
Europe that there is an increasing inclination within the
market to create private copyright protection through
contract. 257
As observed by the Bureau Europ~en des Unions de
Consommateurs (BEUC), the current course of DRM
development "seems to aim at creating a new relationship
between rights-holders and consumers, with altered
consumer rights, freedoms and expectations and towards
the general replacement of copyright law with contract law
and codes. ' 258 The issue is directly related to cases in which
the contract is shaped not as the consequence of negotiation
between parties, but rather as a form of imposition of
unilaterally defined contractual terms and conditions. In
this case the licensor is effectively using the contract, the
license, to manage his rights. Furthermore, in the DRM
contract structure, technology has the power to enforce the
terms of the contract without any support from the legal
system. In general, DRM does not support business models
based upon the first-sale doctrine, disabling consumers
from reselling material. 259
What we see in the contractual structure of DRM is
something similar to a standard form contract, already
popular in commercial and consumer transactions, and
255. Council Directive 96/9, On the Legal Protection of Databases, 2001 O.J.
(L 167) (EC).
256. LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
214 (2002); see also de Werra, supra note 206, at 318.
257. For an analysis of this inclination within the European scene, see
generally GIOVANNI PASCUZZI & ROBERTO CASO, I DIRITTI SULLE OPERE DIGITALI:
COPYRIGHT STATUNITENSE E DIRITTO D'AUTORE ITALIANO (2002); ROBERTO CASO,
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: IL COMMERCIO DELLE INFORMAZIONI DIGITALI TRA
CONTRATTO E DIRITTO D'AUTORE (2004).
258. DRM-BEUC Position paper, supra note 236, at 3.
259. See Burk, supra note 98, at 1100 (citing David Nimmer et. al., The
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 137 (1999), arguing
that licensing a work may be attractive to a copyright holder because the first
sale doctrine does not apply if a copy of a work is leased rather than sold).
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particularly diffused in technological transfers, licensing
intellectual property, and service agreements. 26 0
The American legal system, generally, has allowed the
use of these kinds of agreements and has enforced their
terms.261 Federal and state legislatures have enacted
statutes to protect the consumer against aggressive
contracting and his own ignorance in certain
transactions. 26 2 Furthermore, in the common law systems
there is in force the "doctrine of unconscionability" 263 with
the effect of extending the protection of weak contractual
parties as far as possible,26 4 giving judges the power to
260. DRM has been defined as "a souped-up standard form contract." Ian
Kerr & Jane Bailey, The Implications of Digital Rights Management for Privacy
and Freedom of Expression, 2 INFO. COMM. & ETHICS IN SoC'Y 87, 89 (2004).
261. For an overview of standard terms in American law, see EDWARD ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004).
262. See Burke, supra note 227.
263. Codified in UCC § 2-302 (1978).
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
Id. For more regarding unconscionability, see Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 505 (1967) (coining the terms "procedural" and "substantive"
unconscionability); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293
(1975); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, (2003); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law
in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws,
and Related Limitations On The Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283
(1995); John A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 931 (1969); Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: U.C.C. Article 2
and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REV. 359, 367 (2001). On the
relation between contract and intellectual property, see Lemley, supra note 240,
at 151-58 (1999); Nimmer, supra note 73.
264. See DAVID W. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH- CENTURY
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 57 (1996) (describing the doctrine's
introduction in the 1960s and subsequent adoption); see also Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 227, at 456 (noting that unconscionability doctrine
"affords courts considerable discretion to strike unfair terms directly rather
than covertly by stretching less-applicable rules in order to reach a fair result").
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determine boundaries of this remedy.265 On the other hand,
the EU framework is based on a set of rules incorporated in
the European Union Council Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts.266  This Directive invalidates
standardized terms that are unfair and result in a
significant imbalance of obligations between the parties to
the detriment of the consumer. 267 It also contains a non-
exclusive grey list of unfair terms. The EU Directive sets
only a minimum baseline, while every EU Member State
has national consumer legislation that protects consumers
who adhere to standardized conditions. The Commission
has stated that "general contractual terms and conditions
aim to replace the legal solutions drawn up by the legislator
and at the same time to replace the legal rules in force in
the Community by unilaterally designed solutions with a
view to maximizing the particular interests of one of the
parties."268 If we can accept this pattern as a reasonable
solution for the situation of conflict between the two
opposing rights, we can probably find a resolution to
intellectual property disputes over digital content, different
from the difficult legislative options.
We have to decide if we want all content rights
transactions to fall under contract instead of copyright law,
and, if so, we have to find remedies to protect the
consumer's rights. "Consumer contracts governing the use
265. See Cristiana Cicoria, The Protection of the Weak Contractual Party in
Italy vs. United States Doctrine of Unconscionability. A Comparative Analysis, 3
GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES (2003), http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol3/iss3/
art2. The doctrine of unconscionability is a doctrine of contract law that makes
a contract term unenforceable when is demonstrated the occurrence of both
procedural and substantive unfairness. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1524 (6th
ed. 1990). For the distinction of these two kind of unconscionability, see Leff,
supra note 263, at 487-88.
266. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,
1993 O.J. (L95/29).
267. The Directive applies only to consumer transactions, i.e., those
involving an individual who acquires products for her own personal
consumption and not for business or professional use. Id.
268. Report from the Commission On the Implementation of Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, at
13 (Apr. 27, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/consint/
safe-shop/unf_contterms/uct03-en.pdf.
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of digital material," in particular, "must be fair and
transparent."269
C. The Role of DRM in the EU Internal Market:
Interoperability, Development and Correct Use
As noted above, there is no doubt that the arrival and
actual explosion of information and creative material in
digital form has produced many new possibilities and
challenges. One of the new challenges is in the adoption of
DRMSs, that is, the process by which rights-holders of
digital materials and content providers seek to implement
usage rules and ensure that they are respected. 270 Because
the rights of rights-holders and consumers must also be
balanced in the digital environment, in the public interest
we need to clarify the role set out by DRM and its capability
to develop successful content-based business models. 271
The DRM, as already demonstrated, has potential to
ensure a large variety of positive and negative effects. 272 It
could offer a wider range of choices for consumers to access
and use digital material in a number of ways. DRM also
introduces a more valuable and efficacious remedy to fight
commercial piracy and illegal malpractice of file sharing.
But, at the same time, it could offer more information for
rights-holders about consumer use of digital media and
allow for the monitoring of consumer use of digital
material. 273 In this way, content providers are able to
restrict the number of uses and the power of users on the
media. The problem is that some of these restrictions may
be absolutely unjustified, against the law, and may make
the judicial enforcement of copyright unnecessary.
Nobody can force rights-holders not to protect their
business. The challenge is to find, in this new digital
environment, an appropriate balance between the
269. DRM-BEUC Position Paper, supra note 236, at 3.
270. For a general overview on DRM, see ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note
212.
271. See DRM-BEUC Position Paper, supra note 236, at 3.
272. See, e.g, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 83; ROSENBLATT ET
AL., supra note 212;
273. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 207, at 585; Bygrave, supra note 207.
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conflicting rights-"a balance between a copyright holder's
legitimate demand for effective . . .protection . . . and the
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce. '274
In attempting to answer this question, it is useful to
articulate the points of contact and tension between the
different approaches adopted by countries to ensure
copyright protection, in particular the pragmatic European
approach in the political debate over DRM technologies. For
example, in the United States under the DMCA copyright
holders are allowed to request subpoenas for information on
copyright infringers without taking further legal action.275
In some cases they have also tried to use-without
success-the same means to access the personal
information of ISP customers they assert are infringing
their rights.276
In this sense the European Union has, de facto, aligned
its copyright law more closely to that of the United States
because Article 9 of the Directive on the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights stipulates very similar
provisional and precautionary measures. 277 Furthermore, in
the European Union, the legal framework for digital
content protection was established by the previously
mentioned Directive on the Harmonization of Copyright
and Related Rights in the Information Society (EUCD).
That Directive supports the use of technological measures
to protect content against illegal use, but at the same time
encourages the interoperability of different copyright
274. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
275. 17 U.S.C. 512(h) (2000).
276. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Accepting Verizon's interpretation, the DC circuit
considered that the DMCA did not authorize a subpoena when the offending
material is stored on a person's home computer, since the applicable provision is
addressed to "material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for [a] service provider." Id. at 1234 (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(1) (2000)). For a detailed note of the case, see Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon:
Applying the Subpoena Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405
(2004).
277. See Council Directive 2004/48/CE, art. 9, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 16, 17;
supra Part II.C.
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protection systems, addressing the use of DRM systems.
The political and technical debate over the role of DRM in
the EU internal market reached fever pitch in July 2003,
when a Commission, the Broadband Content Workshop,
"showed that operators, Internet service providers, content
providers, broadcasters and the entertainment industry
[were] trying to adapt their activities through new forms of
partnerships crossing the traditional boundaries, ' 278 and
that to develop successful content-based business models,
they required adequate DRMs.279 However, market take-up
of DRMs is still extremely fragmented. "Although devices
are being progressively 'DRM enabled,' most consumers do
not yet have devices equipped to use DRM services. It is
also unclear whether, or how much, they would pay for
them."28 0 The Commission therefore, as part of the eEurope
2005 Action Plan, established a High Level Group
(hereinafter HLG) on DRMs in March 2004.281 The High
Level Group Final Report, presented on July 8, 2004,
represents a compromise on basic principles and
recommendations for future actions in three main areas.
278. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee of the Regions, Connecting Europe at High Speed: Recent
Developments in the Sector of Electronic Communications at 13 (Feb. 3, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2004/com2004 0061en01.pdf.
279. See EUROPEAN COMM'N FACTSHEET 20, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2004),
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/doc/factsheets/020-ipr-drm-octoberO4.pdf.
280. Id.
281. The eEurope 2005 action plan succeeds the 2002 action plan, which
mainly focused on Internet connectivity in Europe. The new action plan, which
was approved by the Seville European Council in June 2002, is aimed at
translating this connectivity into increased economic productivity and improved
quality and accessibility of services for all European citizens based on a secure
broadband infrastructure available to the largest possible number of people. See
the eEurope 2005 Action Plan, eEurope 2005: An Information Society for All,
available at http://europa.eu.int/information-society/eeurope/2005/indexen.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2005). Current members of the group are: GESAC, IFPI,
Vivendi, Eurocinema, FEP (Federation European Publishers), BBC, France
Telecom, Vodafone, Fastweb, Philips, Nokia, Alcatel, HP, New Media Council,
BEUC. See Digital Rights Management, http://europa.eu.int/informationsociety/
eeurope/2005/all about/digital-rights-man/highjlevel-group/index-en.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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In this document, the HLG outlines the recommended
actions concerning some key aspects: DRM and
interoperability, impact of DRM on levies, migration to
legitimate services, and consumer confidence. 28 2
With regard to interoperability, the HLG found that,
while open standards are best for true cross-platform
interoperability, various scenarios are currently possible,
ranging from different proprietary systems to standards-
based convergence. 28 3 "It was agreed that DRM must not be
allowed to become a commercial or technology licensing
control point, that DRM implementation must not be
undermined by lack of compliance, and that DRMs must fit
business models, not vice versa. ' 28 4 Recommendations
included that "[s]takeholders should continue work on open,
cross-platform DRM systems and standards," that the
European Union "should foster open standards and discuss
compliance mechanisms with stakeholders," and that
"Member States should foster open standards, ensur[ing]
that DRM security will not be undermined and enforce[ing]
282. See EU GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS., FINAL REPORT, supra note
99. Because technical protection measures and management systems in general
make possible compensation of rights-holders in a direct way, it seems illogical
to also preserve a levies system. In fact, with this double compensation system,
rights-holders could be compensated twice for the same reason. They control
and receive remuneration for private copying with the technical protection
measures and also receive another remuneration for the same copying with the
levies. See Marie-Th6r~se Huppertz, The Point of View of Software Industry, in
THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKET OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY: WHO IS GOING TO SHAPE THE IPR SYSTEM IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM? 70 (Frank Gotzen ed., 2003). Article 5.2(b) of the Copyright
Directive seems to want to avoid this inconvenience. Member States, in fact,
may allow for a limitation to the exclusive reproduction right,
in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person
for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly
commercial, on condition that the right holders receive fair
compensation which takes account of the application or non application
of technological measures.
Council Directive 29/2001, On the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J.
(L 167) 10, 16 (EC).
283. See EU GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 99.
284. EUROPEAN COMM'N FACTSHEET 20, supra note 279.
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anti-piracy measures. ' 286  The current absence of
interoperability between the various technological solutions
offered by manufacturers and their lack of interest in
devising shared open standards constitutes a significant
restraint on the free circulation of creative works because
consumers are unable to decide autonomously where to buy,
and they often must choose only content that fit their
devices. 28 6 However, the assumption of a DRM system able
to ensure interoperability between very different hardware
and software systems, at the moment, is quite utopian. In
order to promote interoperability among different content-
distribution and playback devices any industry standard
would have to be adopted by service providers as well as
consumer electronics manufacturers. Service providers,
such as cable operators, license content under an agreement
for copyright protection. Therefore, to obtain real
interoperability, service providers and content owners
would have to accept the same standard, with the
consequence that a standardized DRM system could be
more vulnerable to piracy. 28 7 Furthermore, the imposition
of a standard in this start-up situation could have the effect
of restraining all the investments of new and more
advanced systems. 28 8
Actually, in practice industry has been able to reach
agreements on the adoption of technological protection
measures for special format. The case of DVD is the most
285. Id.
286. See UNION FEDERALE DES CONSOMMATEURS-QUE CHOISIR, VENTE DE
MUSIQUE EN LIGNE: LES CONSOMMATEURS SONT PIEDS ET POINGS LIES PAR APPLE ET
SONY, http://www.quechoisir.org/ ("Cette absence totale d'interop6rabilit6 entre
les DRM enlbve non seulement au consommateur son pouvoir de choisir
inddpendamment ses materiels et son lieu d'achat, mais constitue aussi un frein
rdel A la libre circulation des oeuvres de l'esprit.") (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
287. Recently (Jan. 19, 2005) Intertrust Technologies, Matsushita Electric
Industrial (Panasonic), Royal Philips Electronics, Samsung Electronics, and
Sony Corporation announced the formation of the Marlin Joint Development
Association. This new step toward reducing the many different DRM systems
used today will provide standard specifications for content management and
protection for the consumer electronics industry. See Press Release, CE and
DRM Technology Leaders to Create a DRM Toolkit for Consumer Devices
(Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://www.intertrust.com/main/news/200 3 -2 0 0 5/
050119_marlin.html.
288. See Huppertz, supra note 282, at 70.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
evident example. In any case, the same EUCD avoids the
requirement of any particular standard yet encourages the
compatibility and interoperability of different systems.28 9
On the question of the migration to legitimate services,
the HLG emphasizes the importance for consumers of
legitimate online services to create a thriving e-content
market.290 According to HLG, DRMs could play an
important role, enabling new business models and
preventing unauthorized use. Stakeholders recommend that
the European Union and Member States should reflect in
their policy positions that abuse and unauthorized file
sharing of copyrighted content will not be tolerated, that
there is a necessity to provide political commitment to
protecting content delivered by DRMs, and that they should
promote awareness among consumers of legitimate
alternative offerings. 291
On the other hand, the HLG report never expresses any
"recognition of the lawfulness and benefits of private
copying for consumers and the many options of peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks for usages that are not illegal, e.g., for
the promotion of content or the potential benefits of P2P
networks for unknown/independent artist[s] .,292
Furthermore, the paper never distinguishes between
piracy for commercial purposes and individual acts of
private consumers, almost assuming that current
consumer usages are illegitimate.
Finally, the HLG focuses on the relationship between
DRMs and private copying levies. Levies were introduced in
many European countries to compensate rights-holders for
the limitation to their exclusive right of reproduction
289. Id. As pointed out in the text, "the practice has shown that industry
was able to reach agreements for the adoption of DRMs for certain formats (e.g.
DVD video)." Id. However, the Copyright Directive avoids requiring a single
management standard but encourages the compatibility and interoperability of
different systems. In fact, even if the goal could be the development of a global
system, the content industry is worried that a standardized management
system could be more vulnerable to piracy. Furthermore, the imposition of a
standard, in this start-up time, can have the result of stopping all of the
investments in the development of new, more advanced systems.
290. EU GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 17.
291. Id. at 17-18.
292. DRM-BEUC Position Paper, supra note 236, at 5.
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regarding reproductions made for private use. 293 The
"establishment of levies emerged in view of the de facto non-
enforceability of the reproduction right."294 "Levies operate
as a tax on all purchasers, irrespective of whether [they are]
engaged in private copying or not."295 Even if the HLG
paper ignores important consumer perspective on levies, it
underlines the necessity to avoid double payment and to
use levies as a mechanism to compensate for piracy.296 In
fact, as noted by one commentator, because technical
protection measures and management systems generally
allow rights-holders to be compensated in a direct way, it
seems illogical to also maintain a levies system. 297 In fact,
with this double compensation system, rights-holders could
be compensated twice for the same reasons-they control
and receive remuneration for private copying with the
technical protection measures, and then they receive
remuneration again for the same copying with the levies. 298
The same European Consumers' Organization has
remarked that levies systems continue to be imposed
incorrectly on an increasing number of multipurpose
devices in most of the European Member States. 299
293. On the levies systems in the DRM-based services, see P. BERNT
HUGENHOLTZ ET AL., THE FUTURE OF LEVIES IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT,
(2003), http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf; J6rg
Reinbothe, Address Before the Conference on The Compatibility of DRM and
Levies: Private Copying, Levies and DRMs against the Background of the EU
Copyright Framework (Sep. 8 2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/copyright/documents/2003-speech-reinbotheen.htm.
294. EU GROUP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MGMTS., FINAL REPORT, supra note 99, at 14.
295. DRM-BEUC Position Paper, supra note 236, at 9.
296. On the European levies system, see Costanze Ulmer-Eilfort, Private
Copying and Levies for Information- and Communication-Technologies and
Storage Media in Europe, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at
447.
297. See Huppertz, supra note 282, at 70.
298. Id.
299. See DRM-BEUC Position Paper, supra note 236, at 9. The uncontrolled
imposition of levies does not take into account the content of the recital 35 of
the Information Society Directive that stipulates the concrete harm of private
copies must be declared when determining the compensation. In fact recital 35
states that:
In cases where right holders have already received payment in some
other form, for instance as part of a licence fee, no specific or separate
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Another challenge related to the development of DRMs
briefly mentioned in the HLG report concerns the data
protection issue and tracing individuals accessing protected
content. In Europe, the collection of personal information by
rights-holders is regulated by data protection principles
stipulated by Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
personal data. 300 These principles can contradict the
legitimate purpose used by rights-holders to prevent misuse
of protected information through technological protection
measures that are able to trace and monitor users and their
preferences. Users, for example, often identify themselves
before being able to download a song from a content
provider. Their profile is then completed with information
through the unique identifier included in each piece of
music downloaded by the same user. This technique allows
for the profiling of the user based on the quality and
quantity of contents downloaded or used. Rightly so,
"Article 2(3) (a) of Directive 2004/48/EC, on the enforcement
of intellectual property rights, confirmed the principle that
the Directive 2004/48/EC does not affect Directive 95/46/EC
and therefore the application of the data protection
principles. '"301 For these reasons, technological protection
payment may be due. The level of fair compensation should take full
account of the degree of use of technological protection measures
referred to in this Directive. In certain situations where the prejudice
to the right holder would be minimal, no obligation for payment may
arise.
Council Directive 2001/29, On the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of
Copyrightand Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 4
(EC).
300. Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art.
1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 35 (EC).(requiring Member States to ensure the rights
and freedoms of persons with regard to the processing of personal data, and in
particular their right to privacy, in order to ensure the free flow of personal
data in the Community).
301. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON
DATA PROTECTION ISSUES RELATED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2005),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justicehome/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp 104_en.
pdf. The Working Party has also noted that:
While control and tracing is developing at the source with the intention
of checking "a priori" every user downloading legally information on
the Internet, the protection of copyright information also leads most of
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measures should also guarantee anonymous access to
network services while the information collected should be
compatible with the purpose of the service, and the storage
of personal data should be limited in time.
D. Some New Business Models for Digital Media
The action of new technologies has upset traditional
business models. In particular, the diffusion of peer-to-peer
systems has been a determinant in the emergence of
successful digital business in the music industry. Content
providers have realized the benefits of technology in
delivering content to multiple broadcast markets. Also, the
possibilities offered by the Internet in terms of lower costs,
reproduction, and distribution offer customers an attractive
and legal alternative to illegal file sharing. The content
industry, in particular the recording industry, is developing
legitimate online services that will displace illegal file-
sharing.
Even if, as declared by the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), the emergence of a
successful digital business has reached the peak in 2004,
important initiatives in this sector had already begun in
December 2001.302 Unfortunately, these first attempts were
unsuccessful. The main reason for their failure was that,
although the majors decided to get in on these digital
projects, they never really took the challenge of developing
an entirely new business model compatible with the
economics of digital distribution. Instead, they maintained
their old practices based upon dependence on predictable
regular income and high profit margins profits guaranteed
copyright actors to take actions "a posteriori" and to conduct
investigations towards users suspected of infringements.
Id.
302. IFPI:05 DIGITAL MusIc REPORT, supra note 117, at 4. In that year, in
fact, were launched two online distribution services based on the idea of offering
a wide choice of music paying a subscription fee. "Pressplay" (formerly "Duet"),
by Sony Music Entertainment and Universal Music Group, provided access to
the entire catalogue of three of the five major labels and "MusicNet," by AOL
Time Warner, Bertelsmann AG and the EMI Group. See Brad King,
Pressplay Arrives in Music Fog, WIRED, Jan. 23, 2002, available at http:I/
www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,49934,00.html.
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by the sale of physical products. 303 Furthermore, they failed
to take into account the new consuming trends, pointing
towards the acquisition of single songs rather than entire
albums. So, consumers' reasonable expectations to obtain
music files for significantly reduced prices were frustrated.
Users not only want ease of access, but also flexibility of
use. They want to be able to listen to the music purchased
at all the times they want, and to burn them into CDs to
make their own collections, lend them to friends, and play
them on stereos, just like they used to do before the advent
of music in digital format.30 4 Originally, music industry
services prevented all these features by securing works
with technological protections and dictating the terms of
use in order to protect content.
The main problem associated with the first fee-based
services was that customers entered a contract where they
had no negotiating power at all because content owners de
facto unilaterally determine and dictate terms and
conditions limiting consumers' behaviors with technological
protection measures. As already discussed, the lack of legal
limits and the extension of self-help measures can move
responsibility for the enactment of legal regulations from
the hands of policy-makers into those of the major
distribution companies.3 05
Meanwhile, in the last few years new business models
have emerged in the digital music market. The year 2004
was a milestone for the content industry. 30 6  The
combination of searching, browsing, downloading and
portability is transforming the way to consuming content.
An essential event in the growth of these services is the
portable player explosion. As in the past when the Sony
VCR opened a new market for the film industry, today the
incredible diffusion of portable players, like Apple's iPod,
303. See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to
Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 450,
490-91 (2002).
304. See Brendan Scott, Copyright in a Frictionless World: Toward a Rhetoric
of Responsibility, FIRSTMONDAY http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_9/scott/
(last visited Sep. 9, 2005).
305. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
306. IFPI:05 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT, supra note 117, at 6.
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have convinced the recording industry to start relevant
online services.
Increasingly seen in the digital services arena are two
business models: pay-per-download and subscription
services. 30 7 The first one gives consumers the chance to own
music with greater flexibility than traditional media since
single tracks can be selected, downloaded, and managed. 308
This model is used by services such as iTunes Music Store
and MSN Music. 309
Subscription services offer downloadable content for a
monthly fee. Usually these services allow the user to access
music file databases with the possibility of purchasing
selected tracks. This model characterizes services like the
new Napster, Rhapsody and Virgin Digital that offer
streaming access for a monthly fee while download and use
on portable players is possible for an extra per-track fee or
allowed as long as the consumer continues to be a
subscriber. 310 This trend suggests a long-term shift in music
consumption from traditional physical media to digital sales
with an increasing market for single track sales. In other
words, digital use is expected to replace CD buying.
Nobody can deny that the forerunner of this new legal
alterative was Apple's iTunes Music Store offering the most
successful online distribution service in combination with
an extremely popular portable music device. 31 '
The Apple system was first launched in the United
States in April 2003 and expanded into three key European
307. Id. at 7.
308. Id.
309. Apple Music Store, http://www.apple.com/itunes/store/ (last visited Sep.
12, 2005); MSN Music, http://music.msn.com (last visited Sep. 12, 2005). For a
comprehensive directory of services, see Pro-Music, http://www.pro-music.org
(last visited Sep. 12, 2005).
310. Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Sep. 13, 2005); Real
Rhapsody, http://www.real-download.com (last visited Sep. 13, 2005); Virgin
Digital, http://www.virgindigital.com/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2005).
311. Apple's iTunes Music Store, http://www.apple.com/music/store/ (last
visited Sep. 13, 2005). Online services are present also outside the United
States and Europe with over forty services. For a worldwide directory of
Authorized Digital Music Services divided by region, see Pro-Music, http://www.
pro-music.org/musiconline.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
2005] 1185
BUFFALO LAWREVIEW
markets in June 2004-The United Kingdom, France, and
Germany-and extended to eleven other countries in
October and December 2004-Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. It appears to be the first product
created and shaped with consideration to market
expectations, but, more significantly, the first to
understand that strong copy protection cannot benefit the
market and that it is possible to develop a business model
where different interests are allocated with profit.
iTunes Music Store does not require subscription to any
online contract. 312 It instead works on the idea of allowing
single purchases for the reduced price of ninety-nine
cents, 313 and allows buyers unlimited CD burning for
individual songs (and for personal use only, of course), or
copy them onto Apple's MP3 player, iPod, and access them
from five different Macintosh or Windows-compatible
computers, 314 thus offering ease of access, reasonable
flexibility, content security, and quality. In this way,
customers are able to exercise their right to make legal
back-up copies of the material purchased.315 iTunes uses a
proprietary DRM system-called "FairPlay"-based on the
possibility of moving the downloaded files to an unlimited
number of portable devices but with the restriction that it
can be copied only onto five computers. Users can then
make unlimited CD burns, but are limited to burning the
same playlist seven times. FairPlay also enables customers
to create custom playlists but limits the total number of
copies to ten. Probably the most important limitation is that
only iTunes and Quicktime software are able to play
FairPlay files, and the iPod is the only compatible portable
player.31 6
312. On the iTunes case, see GASSER, supra note 38.
313. C 0.99 in the European Countries.
314. See Apple, iTunes, http://www.apple.comlitunes (last visited Nov. 16,
2005). FairPlay iTunes allows burning of the same playlist to seven times in
order to avoid mass-production of copies for illegal use. See id.
315. See GASSER, supra note 38, at 11, 56.
316. "The rapid rise of different portable player systems has exposed one
key problem, namely the lack of interoperability between different devices and
services." IFPI:05 DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 117, at 13.
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However, it seems that the essential reason for the
general consensus it obtained is that it abandoned the idea
of perfect technological control, apparently finding the right
point of convergence between the interests of music labels,
the computer industry, and customers. What is quite
curious about this service is that it was developed within
the computer industry and has not been the product of the
music industry which, at least in theory, should be the most
concerned about developing possible business models and
finding a way to satisfy its customers.
From these examples we can conclude that when the
supply of content available digitally proliferates, it could
compete with piracy. The increase and proliferation around
the world of services offering digital music have, in fact,
established new markets and new business models.
Consumers have accepted these new initiatives and their
attitudes toward digital music are changing.
As demonstrated by the emergent business in the
digital music sector, pay-per-downloads and subscription
services are the real weapons to control music piracy.317
Fighting the problem of Internet piracy with a more
restrictive protection of content can only contribute to
change the traditional balancing of public and private
rights.
CONCLUSION
We have illustrated how new communication
technologies have increased the difficulties of maintaining a
balance between the inherently contradictory interests of
intellectual property rights-holders and the general public.
We have also seen that different forms of government
intervention have not removed inequalities. On the
contrary, they have brought about detrimental side effects
for consumers because they have expanded the legislative
boundaries of intellectual property rights and embedded
technical and contractual constraints into digital media.
The legislative solutions under U.S. and EU law have
shown a determined trend toward the protection of content
317. See Stuart Haber et al., If Piracy is the Problem, is DRM the Answer?,
in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 224.
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and management of rights which are considered
fundamental to ensure the compliance of a business model
with contractual and regulatory demands. 318
We have, at the end, discussed how European
harmonization emulates the leading American regulatory
model, seriously affecting the configuration of the
continental pattern. In fact, even though eight directives 319
have been adopted in the last fourteen years in the field of
copyright and information society, EU copyright legislation
is yet to be completely granted by every Member State's
national legislation. For that reason, some commentators
support the idea of a consolidation of the Acquis
Comm unautaire,320 so that copyright protection would be
granted directly at the EU level and would apply to its
entire territory.321 On the other hand, we have noticed an
unprecedented effort to organize transnational policy
planning and to create a safe international legal
infrastructure directed at safeguarding "U.S. global
economic hegemony .. .upon the production, ownership,
318. See BIL ROSENBLATT & GAIL DYKSTRA, INTEGRATING CONTENT
MANAGEMENT WITH DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2003), http://www.xrml.org/
reference/CM-DRMwhitepaper.pdf.
319. In order: Council Directive 91/250/EEC, On the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42; Council Directive 92/100/EEC, On
Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in
the Field of Intellectual Property, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61; Council Directive
93/83/EEC, On the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and
Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite Broadcasting and Cable
Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15; Council Directive 93/98/EEC, On
Harmonization of Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights,
1993 O.J. (L 290) 9; Council Directive 1996/9/EC, On the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20; Council Directive 2001/84/EC, On the Resale
Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 O.J. (L 272)
32; Council Directive 2001/29/EC, On the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10;
Council Directive 2004/48/EC, On the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16.
320. The acquis communautaire is defined as "everything that was decided
and agreed upon since the establishment of the Communities, whatever the
form in which this was done, whether legally binding or not. It refers to the
body of rules which govern the Communities in whatever field of activity".
P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAw 5 n. 12 (8th ed. 2004).
321. See J6rg Reinbothe, European Copyright-Yesterday, Today,
Tomorrow, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 416, 416-17.
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and marketing of intellectual property-based goods and
services."322
The above-mentioned legislation makes a persuasive
argument for considering limits on freedom of contract 323 in
the framework of intellectual property licensing agreements
because contractual arrangements distort copyright
policy. 324 Technological protection measures, 325 on the other
hand, make possible "a regime that is very similar in its
nature to a property regime. '326 In fact, when rights-holders
are free to use contractual obligations to restrict use, and
are then able to exercise their rights to prevent any use
that is not subject to these restrictions, they can obtain an
absolute monopoly over their works.327
Finally, we can assume a different perspective to
successfully resolve the problem of trying to learn
something from the old media experience. 328 As with other
important events in the evolution of technological progress,
we are confronting a situation in which the owners of older
technology are trying to block the way to what they see as a
threat, thus "fail[ing] to look for ways to cooperate with or
even co-opt the new technology. '329
As both recent and old business experience
demonstrates, new technologies do not destroy the current
322. BETTIG, supra note 46, at 197.
323. For a discussion of the different levels of freedom of contract, see
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1997).
324. While "copyright law defines entitlements protected under a property
rule, and therefore creates rights in rem ...Contract law, by contrast, only
creates rights against parties to the contract." Elkin-Koren, supra note 212, at
102. The same concept is demonstrated in the case ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
325. See the distinction between access control and rights control supra note
236, and accompanying text.
326. Elkin-Koren, supra note 212, at 104.
327. Id. at 112.
328. See Dirk J. G. Visser, Copyright Exemptions Old and New: Learning
from Old Media Experiences, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 40, at
49.
329. Sawhney, supra note 11. The author explains how often people
mistakenly assume that a new technology will directly replace an old one.
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architecture but rather create new trade opportunities. 330
The idea that a new technology renders obsolete all that
came before it is inflaming today's debate about the
protection of digital content. However, as always in the
history of technological progress, the evolution towards new
models has meant an initial loss of revenue for some
industries. But, in the long run, this kind of development
allows new markets to open and ensures new opportunities
for commercial exploitation.
Sometimes, like what is now happening in the field of
digital media, this process can be quite slow because the
government is involved in providing financial and legal aids
in order to prevent social and political costs in the period of
transition. But, this approach has the end result of
upsetting the market and slowing economic growth.
The information society uses precisely this framework.
Digital technologies allow for the wide distribution of
perfect copies at practically no marginal cost with a
disjointing effect on copyright law. This process is
irreversible. It is difficult to imagine that one would react to
this with repeated extensions of intellectual property
rights, or with the arrangement of expensive repressive
equipment in order to make such an extension effective.
This kind of approach is accomplished in the name of the
influential content industry and its business model.
Cultural and economic progress is the result of the free
circulation of ideas and knowledge. Continuing on the road
of restrictions and barriers, or to the indiscriminate use of
technological protection measures, is a return to
330. For example the videocassette recorder (VCR) at first was perceived as
a threat for the content distribution system. In fact,
the VCR offered home tapers the ability to decide when they wanted to
watch particular programs. Taking some scheduling control out of the
hands of broadcasters. Television program producers also feared losing
income from advertisers as home tapers deleted or fast-forwarded
through commercials. The apparent threat of this new technology
caused the filmed entertainment industry to seek to protect its markets
through judicial and legislative action. However, when the dust settled,
the VCR, like television and cable television before it, ha[d] become yet
another ancillary market for the major filmed entertainment
companies.
BETTIG, supra note 46, at 4, 151.
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anachronistic measures of the past, such as what happened
many years ago with the untenable "red flag act" enacted to
defend the carriage industry at the advent of the first
automobiles. 331 The present must learn from the past in
order to avoid the same mistake and to protect the future.
331. After the first recognized automobiles became commonplace, in
England the carriage industry promoted some untenable acts (the 1865 "Red
Flag Act," or "Locomotives on Highways Act") stipulating that all motorized
vehicles be preceded by an ambulating man bearing a red flag in the day, and a
lantern at night. ANTHONY BIRD, ROADS AND VEHICLES 41-42 (1969). This act
restricted the maximum speed of motor cars to 2 miles per hour in urban area
and 4 mph in countryside. This was not welcomed by many, and protests were
organized. The act was modified in 1878.
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